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Wonders never cease. A commentator's gloss upon a statute first
conceived after its enactment as the "best solution" he could devise
for a "difficult problem,"1 confessedly not required either by the
statutory text or legislative history and not, of course, called to the
attention of Congress, has been lifted by a follower to the level of
"codified doctrine."2 The "solution" thus canonized was that of Pro-
fessor Kenneth Culp Davis. His follower, Mr. Harvey Saferstein,
postulates that there was a "common law of non-reviewability," i.e.,
"a refusal to hear an allegation" of arbitrariness,3 which has been
codified as the "doctrine 'committed to agency discretion'" in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).4 For his "common law doctrine"
Mr. Saferstein relies upon some exceptions to the general rule that
arbitrariness is reviewable,'; and from these he distills a "general pre-
sumption against review" in the teeth of an acknowledged "general
presumption for review."0 When one considers that the "general
t A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northivestern University; LLI.M. 1938,
Harvard University.
1. "I do not say that the statutory words require my interpretation. Nor do I say that
the legislative history must be interpreted my way .... It is the best solution that I
have been able to find for a difficult problem." Dais, Adrinistrativc Arbitrariness-A
Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. R v. 823, 825 (1966).
Because the statutory terms posed no "problem" for me, and because the Davis "solu-
tion" rewrites the statute without warrant, I entered upon an extended debate with Pro-
fessor Davis. See articles cited note 9 infra.
2. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REv. 367, 367-68, 374 n.33 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Saferstein].
As summarized by the editors, there has been a "codification of the 'committed to agency
discretion' doctrine in the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. 367.
3. Saferstein 367 n.3, 368 n.5.
4. Id. 368.
5. Mr. Saferstein does not cite pre-1946 cases but relies on Professor Davis for his
"common law doctrine." Id. 367 n.3., 374. Professor Davis states:
Normally, but with occasional exceptions for special circumstances, the courts will
not try to correct arbitrariness or abuse of discretion in such activities as foreign af-
fairs, personnel management, decisions of military officers ...
and so forth. 4 K. DAvIS, A mINSmTRATiVE LAW TREAsu § 28.16, at 17 (Supp. 1985).
6. Saferstein 370 (emphasis added), 372, 379.
Professor Davis himself, citing Professor Jalfe's conclusion that "[p]resumptively, an ex-excise of discretion is reviewable for. . . 'abuse'" states: "I agree.' Davis, Administrative
Arbitrariness is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. RE%. 613, 6.17 (1967). "[J]udicial re-
view is the rule ... It is a basic right; it is a traditional power and the intention to exclude
it must be made specifically manifest." Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HAnv. L.
Rav. 401, 432 (1958). As the Supreme Court as recently expressed it, "only upon a show-
ing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts
restrict access to judical review." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141
(1967).
Explaining the first exception to Section 10, Chairman Walter of the Senate Judiciary
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presumption for review" is buttressed by the clear Section 10(e)
directive that the courts "shall ... set aside agency action . . . found to
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law,"7 it is a wondrous feat to emerge with "agency
immunity from review."8 Mr. Saferstein's uncritical acceptance of the
demonstrably untenable Davis "solution" prompts me to essay a com-
pact statement of the evidence I have marshalled in the course of a
lengthy debate with Professor Davis9 in order to aid other readers to
grasp the essentials.
For more than 125 years before the passage of the APA the Supreme
Court declared again and again that there is no room for arbitrary
action in our system, that power to act arbitrarily is not delegated.
10
Together with almost all of the Circuits it stated without equivocation
across a wide spectrum of administrative activity that arbitrary action
is reviewable." True, there were occasional exceptions; but in view
Committee said: "Legislative intent to forbid judicial review must be, if not specific and
in terms, at least clear, convincing and unmistakable under this bill." S. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1946) [hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 248]. The House Report
states: "To preclude judicial review under this bill, a statute, if not specific in withhold-
ing such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an Intent to
withhold it." S. Doc. No. 248, at 275. Both Senate and House Reports state, "Very rarely
do statutes withhold judicial review." Id. at 212, 275.
7. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946).
8. The doctrine "committted to agency discretion" "is also used to preserve an
agency's immunity from review against a claim that the review provisions of the APA
override the relevant common law doctrine of nonreview." Saferstein 369. But see Wales
v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 900, 904 (Ct. Cl. 1955): "[T]he doors of this court are al-
ways open to grant relief" against "arbitrary or capriciousI action. "The Supreme Court
has long recognized the right of the court to review such action." And Mr. Saferstein
charges that Judge Friendly and myself "read the doctrine out of the APA"I Safersten
375, 373.
9. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 55
[hereinafter cited as Berger, Article]; 4 K. DAvis, ADMINIsrATivE LAW TREATisE § 28.16
(Supp. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Supplement]; Berger, Administrative Arbitrari-
ness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 783 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Berger, Reply]; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
814 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Final Word]; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness
-A Rejoinder to Professor Davis' "Final Word," 114 U. PA. L. REv. 816 (1966) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Berger, Rejoinder]; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114
U. PA. L. Rav. 823 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Postscript]; Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REv. 601 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Sequel];
Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. Rav. 643
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Not Always].
10. E.g., "there is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary
power." Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908). Our Institu-
tions "do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbi-
trary power." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). "The delegated power, of
course, may not be exercised arbitrarily .... " FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965).
For other citations, see notes 82-87 inIra.
11. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 277 (1933):
"[Aln arbitrary or capricious finding does violence to the law. It is without the sanction
of the authority conferred. And an inquiry into the facts . . . belongs to the judicial
province .... . United States v. Pierce, 327 US. 515, 536 (1946) ("abuse of tile Commis-
sion's discretion'); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) (court should consider
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of the haphazard, compartmented development of "administrative law"
-- only recently did that rubric supplant "Druggists," "Mines and
Minerals," and "Telegraph and Telephone" where one had been
wont to seek light on administrative law problems-it is not sur-
prising that judges were not impelled to coordinate the exceptions
with the general rule. Let us defer whether an individual should, or
indeed constitutionally may, be left at the mercy of unreviewable, and
therefore unbridled, arbitrariness' on grounds of judicial or adminis-
trative convenience,13 and turn to the statute. For it is the statute, over
whether the "Commission abused its discretion'); Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167,
172 (1936) (officer's "decision must be accepted unless he exceeds his authority by making
a determination which is arbitrary or capricious'); Shields v. Utah-Idaho R.R., 305 U.S.
177, 185 (1938) (whether finding "was arbitrary and capricious'); Silberschein v. United
States, 266 U.S. 221, 225 (1924) (order of Veterans Bureau final "unless . .. clearly ar-
bitrary or capricious.') Manufacturers R.R. Co. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457, 481 (1918)
(discretion of ICC not to be disturbed unless it "amounts to an abuse of power'); Lang-
nes v. Green, 282 US. 531, 541 (1931) ("When invoked as a guide to judicial action it
means a sound discretion ... a discretion exercised not arbitrarily...'').
Eastland Co. v. FCC, 92 F.2d 467, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (court must affirm unless action
is "arbitrary and capricious'); Ickes v. Underood, 141 F.2d 546, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1944)
(whether Secretary of the Interior applied statute in a "reasoned manner"; court will is-
sue restraining order where he acted in a "capricious and arbitrary manner'); Amer Co.
v. United States, 142 F.2d 730, 736 (1st Cir. 1940) (libel under Food & Drug Act; unless
"arbitrary or unreasonable, the terms of the exception can be prescribed in the discretion
of the administrator'); Marlin-Rockwel Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 596, 587 (2d Cir. 1941)
("Only if the Board has acted arbitrarily, may its discretion ... be overridden'); Parke.
Austin & Lipscomb v. FTC, 142 F.2d 437, 442 (2d Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Botany Worsted
Mills, 133 F. 2d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 1943); Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Delaware &
H.R. Corp., 16 F. Supp. 732, 737 (D. Pa. 1936) ("It is our function to protect litigants from
arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority'); NLRB v. Clarksburg Pub. Co.. 120 F.2d
976, 980 (4th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Ed. Friedrich, Inc., 116 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1940);
General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1942) (court
"should not become a mere rubber stamp for the approval of arbitrary action'); Williams
v. Bowles [OPA], 56 F. Supp. 283,284 (W.D. Ky. 1944); Schreiber v. United States [Postmaster
General], 129 F.2d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1942); Valley Mould & Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 116
F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 1941) (may interfere where action "is arbitrary . . . where there
is abuse of discretion'); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 693, 701 (8th Cir.
1940) ("conclusive, unless arbitrary or capricious'). In the 9th Circuit, Markall v. Bowles,
58 F. Supp. 463, 465 (N.D. Cal. 1944), stated: "[U]nder general principles of jurisprudence
the right of appeal to the courts in the case of administrative action of an arbitrary or
capricious nature is established."
12. "[O]ur age," states Professor Jaffe, "has produced elsewhere, and even on occasion
in our own country, the most monstrous expressions of administrative power." Jaffe,
The Right to Jidicial Review, 71 HIUv. L. REv. 401, 405 (1958). "The discretion of a
judge is said by Lord'Camden to be the law of tyrants .... In the best it is often times
caprice; in the worst, it is efery vice, folly, and passion to which human nature'is liable,"
as the infamous example of Chief Justice Jeffreys should remind us. BouviEa's LAW Dic-
TIONA.Y, "Discretion." Quoting an earlier dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, the Su-
preme Court stated: "[U]nless we make the requirements of administrative action strict
and demanding, expertise ... can become a monster which rules with no practical lim-
its on its discretion." Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962)
(emphasis in original). "A government which . . .held the lives, the liberty, and the
property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute despotism and unlimited control
of even the most democratic depositary of power is after all but a despotism." Loan Ass'n
v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1876).
13. For an unrestricted statutory mandate Mr. Saferstein would substitute a "thresh-
old inquiry" in every case, not merely in the former "exceptional" case, to determine
whether review should be allowed. The factors to be considered in making such threshold
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which Mr. Saferstein airily skips in reliance on the Davis "solution, 11 4
that is controlling.
I. The Face of the Statute
As enacted,15 Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vided:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion- . . .
(e) . . . the reviewing court shall . . . (B) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law .... 16
The central issue is whether the Section 10(e) directive to set aside
arbitrary action is curtailed by the introdilctory second exception for
action "committed to agency discretion."
Both "discretion" and "abuse of discretion" were terms of settled
meaning at the time the APA was drafted. Courts had long said that
discretion "means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exer-
cised not arbitrarily."17 Given the fact that "delegated power, of course,
determinations are, Mr. Saferstein asserts, "the interest in fostering the most creative and
efficient use of limited agency resources," "the interest in the most efficient allocation of
the resources of the federal courts," and the interest of "the individuals seriously cough
affected by the agency's action to have standing to challenge its validity." Safersteln 371.
Except where Congress has clearly provided for or against review of a particular agency
action, Mr. Saferstein claims,
the courts must undertake the difficult task of canvassing the effects of judicial re-
view upon the two institutions irvolved, and then determining whether the adverse
effects upon either institution are justified by the extra protection that might be af-
forded by review to the complaining individuals.
Id. 372. put see Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 360 F.2d 715,
718 (1966) (Friendly, J.) ("[O]nly in the rare-some say nonexistent-case . .. may review
for 'abuse' be precluded").
14. Saferstein 367 n.3, 374 n.32. Were the statute truly ambiguous, were its legislative
history obscure or unenlightening, or were constitutional compulsions absent, Mr. Safer-
stein's "functional analysis" might conceivably offer some guidance. In the circumstances,
however, his "functional" criteria cannot displace what the statute and the Constitution
dearly require.
15. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946). The Act was codified in
1966; Section 10 now appears in 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp III, 1968), in the following slightly
modified form.
... except to the extent that-(l) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2 agency ac-
tion is committed to agency discretion by law .... [t]he reviewipg court shal .. hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or qthcrwise not in accordance witl1
law....
16. 60 Stat. 243 (1946).
17. United States v. Davis, 202 F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1953); Smaldone v. United
States, 211 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Gir. 1954); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931):
"When invoked as a guide to judicial action [discretion] means a sound discretion . . a
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may not be exercised arbitrarily,"' 8 "abuse of discretion" is necessarily
excluded from the compass of a grant of "discretion." The point can-
not be sufficiently stressed. An arbitrary finding "is outside the ad-
ministrative discretion conferred by the statute"; 19 an officer "exceeds
his authority by making a determination which is arbitrary or capri-
cious";20 discretion simply "does not extend to arbitrary and un-
reasonable action."2' "Arbitrary" or "capricious" action-terms used
interchangeably with "abuse of discretion"22 and coupled with it in
Section 10(e)-may be defined as action unreasonable in the circum-
stances.23 In judicial usage, "abuse of discretion" was and remains the
antithesis of "reasonable" action or "sound" discretion.
This traditional antithesis is expressed on the face of the statute:
"discretion" is by the second exception exempted from review, whereas
Section 10(e)-which as enacted was headed "Scope of review"-directs
that courts shall set aside action found to be an "abuse of discretion."
Implicit in that directive under "Scope of review" is the postulate that
there is a "Right of Review" of arbitrariness which is unaffected by the
exception for "discretion. 2 - Otherwise, saving Professor Davis's tor-
discretion exercised not arbitrarily." This was Lord Mansfield's definition, see note 38
infra. Professor Davis ridicules this "interpretation":
The cornerstone of [Berger's] argument about interpreting the APA is his proposition.
repeatedly asserted, that "'discretion' and 'abuse of discretion' are opposites." My
opinion is that of the three categories-(l) exercise of discretion, (2) proper exercise
of discretion, and (3) abuse of discretion-the second and third are oppostes but the
first and third are not. Berger's view that the first and third are opposites is some-
thing like saying that animals and male animals are opposites.
Davis, Not Always 647. Nevertheless, "A reasonable determination is the antithesis of one
which is arbitrary," Dooley v. Highway Truckdrivers & Helpers, 192 F. Supp. 193. 200
(D. Del. 1961). On Professor Davis's reasoning, one might argue that male and female are
the same because both contain the word "male."
18. FCC v. Schreiber, 581 U.S. 279, 292 (1965).
19. United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1955).
20. Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 172 (1936).
21. Newton v. Consol. Gas Co., 259 U.S. 101, 105 (19).21 Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull,
7 F.2d 715, 727 (D. Conn. 1925) ('The use of the words 'within the discreton of the com-
mission' does not import absolute or capricious discretion').
22. "[A]buse of discretion" is "arbitrary action not justifiable" in the circumstances.
NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op, Inc. 285 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1960). "Discre-
tion ... is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary," quoting Hartford Empire Co.
v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 95 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1938); Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124
F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 18-4 F.2d 545, 551 (9th Cir.
1950). See also Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1904) ('because arbitrary
and capricious. .. ,hence an abuse of discretion'); Valley Mould & Iron Corp. v. NLRB,
116 F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 1940); In re Berry & Moser Construction Co., 114 F. Supp. 4-19, 452
(D. Me. 1953).
23. See NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op, Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960).
Judge Friendly said that arbitrary or unreasonable action "is another way of saying that
discretion is abused only where no reasonable man could take the view." Wong Wing
Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 260 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 196), quoting
Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).
24. To Professor Jaffe this seems to require no argument: "The further provisions of
the judicial review section [Section 10(e)] make it clear that the mere presence of agency
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tured "solution," of which more below, the directive is unintelligible-
Congress did not direct an overturn of action which but a few sen-
tences earlier it had "excepted" from review. Nor was this an over-
sight, for, as will appear, the legislators gave unmistakable expression
to their intention to make arbitrariness unqualifiedly reviewable. If
we give to the statutory words the meaning given them by the courts-
as we must under the rule that when an Act employs words which had
acquired a "fixed meaning through judicial interpretations," "they
are used in that sense unless the context requires the contrary ' '2 -
the exception of "discretion" from review shielded "sound" discretion
only; it in no wise exempted the antithetical "abuse of discretion"
from the review expressly directed by Section 10(e).
To fill out the setting, Section 10(a), entitled "Right of Review,"
provides, roughly speaking, that any person "adversely affected or
aggrieved" by agency action "shall be entitled to judicial review
thereof." 20 Arbitrariness, Professor Davis concedes, is not authorized
by the Constitution,2 7 and, in the words of Section 10(e), it is "not in
accordance with law." Consequently arbitrary action constitutes an
infringement of due process in the basic sense of not being "in ac-
cordance with law"; 28 and one who is "adversely affected" by such
conduct has a "Right of Review" unless it can be maintained that
Congress intended to insulate unconstitutional action from review. 29
This analysis is reinforced by a number of considerations. A reading
of "discretion" to include every exercise of discretion-"sound" or
not-is manifestly absurd, because all agency action involves the ex-
ercise of discretion." Self-evidently Congress did not intend to make all
discretion does not oust review. Under the heading 'Scope of Review' an agency action
may be set aside for 'an abuse of discretion,' which dearly implies reviewability despite
the presence of discretion." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 374
(1965).
25. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939). See also Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 US. 1, 59 (1911); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100, 124 (1904).
26. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946), now 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp 111, 1968).
27. See p. 981 infra.
28. See p. 983 infra.
29. See quotation from Senate and House Reports in note 148 infra, and compare
Professor Davis' statements, note 30 and p. 974 infra.
30. In Homovich v. Chapman, 191 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1951), the court rejected
a claim by the Secretary of the Interior that by virtue of the second exception "there
can be no review where agency action 'involves' discretion or judgment. Obviously
the statute does not mean that; almost every agency action 'involves' an element of dis-
cretion or judgment." See also Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir. 1959). Mr. Safer-
stein is in accord. Saferstein 382. Professor Davis is quite clear that "nothing in the legis-
lative history supports an intent to deprive courts of all power to correct any abuse of
discretion." Davis, Supplement 21. Indeed, nothing in the legislative history supports an
intent to deprive courts of all power to correct any abuse of discretion. Professor Davis
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agency action unreviewable, including action that is in excess of
statutory jurisdiction or unconstitutional, for Section 10 specifically
orders such action to be set aside. So much even Professor Davis ac-
cepts.31 Powerful evidence of a legislative intention to exclude "abuse
of discretion" from the scope of the exception for "discretion" is fur-
nished by the face of the statute itself. In striking at action that is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law," Section 10(e) clearly implies that "abuse of dis-
cretion" is "not in accordance with law." The second exception, it
must be remembered, shields only action "by law committed to agency
discretion." Plainly Congress did not mean "by law" to commit to
agency discretion action which it immediately branded as "not in
accordance with law." "Abuse of discretion" is therefore patently ex-
cluded from the ambit of the exception for "discretion," and that ex-
ception consequently in no way limits the Section 10(e) directive.32
The difficulties that Professor Davis experiences with Section 10
spring in considerable part from a refusal to accept that even "discre-
tion" must be subject to preliminary review so as to screen permissible
from impermissible action.33 As Professor Jaffe points out, discretion
is definable as "a power to make a choice within a class of actions.
Despite such discretion, normally a court will review an agency's choice
in order to determine whether it is within the permissible class of
can point to no such history, and in fact disclaims reliance on the history. See p. 976
infra. We need to remember that "[t]he whole point of the jurisdiction to control admin-
istrative action is that it does apply to discretionary power. For it can hardly apply to
anything else." Wade, Anglo-American Administrative Law: More Reflections, b2 L.Q.
Rav. 226, 252 (1966).
31. See note 30 supra, & p. 974 infra.
32. Although the statutory juxtaposition of "by law" and "not warranted by law"
badly shakes Professor Davis's "solution," he has yet to attempt an explanation of this
statutory bar to his view. Instead he asserts, "The Supreme Court unanimously says pre-
cisely the opposite"-sweet are the uses of "precisely---of my "main position" that "the
second exception of section 10 does not curtail the section 10(e) directive to set aside
'abuse of discretion."' For "precisely the opposite" he cites the statement in Panama Ca-
nal Co. v. Grace Lines, 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958), that "Section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act... excludes from the categories of cases subject to judicial review 'agency ac-
tion' that is 'by law committed to agency discretion.'" Davis, Not Always 643. Again the
omnipresent Davis assumption that a bar to review of "discretion" ipso facto constitutes
a bar to review of its abuse. Panama posed no "abuse" problem; there was no occasion
to consider and the Court did not consider the effect of the "discretion" exception upon
the Section 10(e) directive to set aside "abuse of discretion." "At heart," said the Court,
the conflict was over "problems of statutory construction and cost accounting . . . on
which the experts may disagree." 356 U.S. at 317. Where reasonable men may disagree
a decision either way cannot be arbitrary. Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 226-27
(D.C. Cir. 1939); see FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (196-1); Delno v. Market St.
Ry., 124 F-2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942). And this is transformed into a holding which "sa~s
precisely the opposite" of my position.' See also the post-Panama cases cited in notes 145
& 148 infra.
33. See the quotation from Professor Davis at p. 972 & note 40 infra.
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actions."34 In judicial phraseology, the "reviewing court must satisfy
itself that the administrative decision has a 'rational' or 'reasonable'
foundation in law. ' 35
Refusal to accept this function leads Professor Davis to dismiss an
illuminating bit of legislative history. Chairman McCarran had said
that "the thought uppermost in presenting this bill [the APA] is that
where an agency without authority or by caprice makes a decision,
then it is subject to review." Senator Donnell then sought confirma-
tion for his deduction that the mere vesting of discretion "is not in-
tended" to preclude review in the event a party "claims there has been
an abuse of discretion." McCarran replied, "It must not be an arbitrary
discretion. It must be a judicial discretion; it must be a discretion
based on sound reasoning."3 6 Professor Davis comments,
Taking this language at face value would mean that courts would
substitute their discretion for administrative discretion; for if
discretion must be "based on sound reasoning," reviewing courts
may determine what is "sound." 37
Beyond doubt reviewing courts "may determine what is 'sound' "; that
is exactly what discretion has meant from Coke onwards 8 and what
34. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION 359 (1965). "[A]dministrative
discretion encompasses any number of policy decisions which can be supported by a
given set of 'substantial' factual data. Within that range [the administrator's] conclusions
may not be judicially tampered with." But the court may inquire "whether the order is
a rational conclusion and not so 'unreasonable' as to be capricious, arbitrary or an abuse
of discretion." Willapoint Oyster v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 695 (9th Cir. 1949). "The Coni-
mission must exercise its discretion ... within the bounds . . . ," and the courts will "deter-
mine whether the agency has done so," and will inquire whether there is a "rational con-
nection between the facts found and the choice made." Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 167, 168 (1962). Marlin-Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 586, 587
(2d Cir. 1941) ('so unreasonable or capricious as to pass the bounds of permissible discre-
tion").
35. Grace Line v. Federal Maritime Bd., 263 F.2d 709, 711 (2d Cir. 1959). See also
Mississippi Valley Barge Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1934); Gilbertville
Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 126 (1962) (review "limited to consideration
of whether it [the order] has a rational basis'); NLRB v. Jas. H. Matthews F4 Co., 342
F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1965) (order arbitrary "where it is not supportable on any rational
basis"). This was tied into Section 10(e) in Louisville & Nashville RR. v. United States,
268 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Ky. 1967) ("An order is arbitrary within the meaning of the AI'A
if it lacks a stated rational basis').
Judge Prettyman has declared that the courts will "insure that the agency stays within
the bounds of reason and outside the realm of caprice- North Central Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB, 265 F.2d 581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
36. S. Doc. No. 248, at 311.
37. 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.08, at 39 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
DAVIS, TREATISE]. Mr. Saferstein follows in Professor Davis's footsteps when la charges
me with misreading "committed to agency discretion" as "committed to a reasonably exer-
cised discretion." Saferstein 373.
38. In Rooke's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 209, 210 (C.P. 1599), the Commissioners of Sewers
had been empowered to act according "to their discretions," and Coke dedared: "MYlet
their proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the rule of reason anti law." Lord
Mansfield stated, "[D]iscretion . . . means sound discretion guided by law . . . it must not
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is expressed in the judicial inquiry whether "the administrative de-
cision has a 'rational' or 'reasonable' foundation." Although Professor
Davis has distinguished in another context between review of reason-
ableness and review of the wisdom of choices within the area of dis-
cretion,3 9 he overlooks in the present context the distinction between
a determination that a particular action falls outside a permissible
class of actions, and a determination that on all the facts the action,
even if unwise, is reasonable and within the permissible class. The
Section 10 exception from review of action "by law committed to
agency discretion" should thus be read as requiring a threshhold in-
quiry very different from that proposed by Davis and Saferstein: an
inquiry to determine whether the challenged action falls inside or
outside the limits of reasonable discretion. If it falls inside, the court's
inquiry stops; if it falls outside, the court proceeds with review on the
merits as directed by Section 10(e). Whether agency action has a
"rational" basis is and must be open to inquiry;40 and while courts
be arbitrary." Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 827, 34 (1770). The House of Lords in Padfield
v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] 1 All E.R. 694, emphatically re-
jected the Minister's claim that broad statutory terms gave him "unfettered discretion."
Lord Upjohn stated that even had Parliament employed the adjective "unfettered." it
could "do nothing to unfetter the control which the Judicary have over the executive.
namely, that in exercising their powers the latter must act lawfully." Id. at 719. For -aluable
discussion, see Wade, The Myth of Unfettered Discretion, 84 L.Q. Rnv. 166 (1968).
In the words of judge Jerome Frank, "Courts have no power to review administrative
discretion when it is reasonably exrcied ... [but] they an compel correction of an abuse
of discretion," Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1950).
39. In discussing judicial review of legislative rule-making, where insulation of ad-
ministrative power is at its apogee, he states: "In reviewing a legislative rule a court is
free to make three inquiries: (1) whether the rule is within the delegated authority, (2)
whether it is reasonable .... But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to
the desirability or wisdom of the rule .... " I DAvis, TREATIsE § 5.05, at 315.
40. It has been said that "what is irrational is unconstitutional." A. BiCu.L, THE
LEAsT DANGERous BILMaxc 86 (1962); Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 435. 439
(7th Cir. 1947) ("[P]rovided the Board exercised that discretion reasonably, its detennina-
tion is binding upon us'). See also note 35 supra & note 41 infra.
To obscure this simple point Professor Davis engages in a scholastical tour de force,
stamping my analysis as one of my "major misunderstandings":
Although Mr. Berger's main position is that (1) the courts should always review
abuse of discretion or arbitrariness, he couples that with the idea that (2) discretion
should Often "remain unreviewable." These two propositions, in my opinion cannot
possibly be adopted either by Congress or by the courts, because whenever a party
falsely alleges abuse of discretion, the court cannot escape violation of either the
first proposition or the second. If it does not inquire whether discretion has been
abused, it violates the first, and if it does inquire, it reviews the exercise of discre-
tion, thus violating the second. Mr. Berger's main position seems to me as logically
impossible as a square circle.
Davis, Not Always 647. To think that all judicial inquiries whether the exercs of dis-
cretion has a "rational" basis represent squaring the circle! Professor Davis would befog
a simple point by verbal juggling of the many-hued word "review." Of course a court
must preliminarily "review' discretionary action to determine whether it has a "rational"
basis and represents "sound" discretion, or was arbitrry and an "abuse of discretion."
Given absence of "abuse," inquiry halts and "review" of the "wisdon" of the choice is
rejected. This is all that "unreviewable discretion" means, as my earlier citations attest.
973
The Yale Law Journal
will not "substitute their judgment" where they find a "rational" basis
for the administrative choice, they have made amply plain that arbi-
trary action does not sail under that flag.4 '
II. The Davis "Solution"
For Professor Davis the juxtaposition of "discretion" with "abuse
of discretion" engenders a "difficult problem" 42 :
The literal language says that a court shall set aside an abuse of
discretion except so far as the agency may exercise discretion. But
this makes neither grammatical nor practical sense, for the excep-
tion consumes the whole power of the reviewing court.42
But Section 10, as the Supreme Court said in a similar case, "is clear
when its words are given their commonly accepted import."44 Read in
accordance with judicial usage, "discretion" or "reasonable" action
does not "consume the whole power of the reviewing court," and it
makes both "grammatical" and "practical sense" in conjunction with
"abuse of discretion" or unreasonable action. Moreover, no confusion,
grammatical or practical, exists between the exception for "discretion"
and the direction to set aside "arbitrary, capricious" action. Still less
are, or can be, the other Section 10(e) categories "consumed by" the
exception. Who would argue that the exception for "discretion" ren-
dered courts powerless to set aside action "(2) contrary to constitu-
tional right. . ."?4rI How can the exception affect only the words "abuse
41. United States v. Pierce, 327 U.S. 515, 536 (1946): "Unless in some specific respect
there has been ...abuse of the Commission's discretion, the reviewing court is without
btuthority to ... substitute its own view concerning what should be done . " So too, NLRB
v. Muskingum Elec. Co-op, Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1960), distinguished the "substi-
tution of judgment" from inquiry whether the "circumstances clearly show an abuse of
discretion." Speaking with reference to Section 10(e), Jenkins v. Macy, 237 F. Supp. 60,
62 (D. Mo. 1964), stated: "[A]s long as the administrative agency ... had a sound basis for
the decision made, and the decision was not arbitrary ... then the courts will not sub-
stitute their own decision .... Williams v. Bowles, 56 F. Snpp. 283, 284 (D. Ky. 1944) (court
"has no authority to substitute its judgment . . . so long as the ruling is not [ar-
bitrary]"). See also Automobile Sales Co. v. Bowles, 58 F. Supp. 469, 471 (D. Ohio 1944);
Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592, 602 (D.N.J. 1966).
42. Davis, Postscript 825, quoted note I supra.
43. Davis, Supplement 21.
44. United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 417 (1938).
45. "An agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory power," Social Se-
curity Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946); far less the constitutionality of its actions.
Whether Professor Davis adheres to his rejection of a reading that "consumes tile whole
power of the reviewing court" is by no means clear. His last word was that "the literal
reading" of the "except" clause is always used in any combination other than with the"abuse of discretion" phrase. The literal reading is used in combination with (a), (b), (c),
(d), and all parts of (e) except the "abuse of discretion phrase." Davis, Not Always 650
n.11. By "literal reading" he means one opposed to mine, e.g., "Mr. Berger wants to in-
terpret away the 'except' clause. The courts uniformly give full effect to the literal words
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of discretion" and leave all the rest of Section 10(e) untouched?
40 A
reading which entails such irrational consequences must be summarily
dismissed.
Whether the entirely verbal affinity between "discretion" and "abuse
of discretion" gives way to the antithetical meaning given the terms
by the courts, or is disregarded because to read discretion "literally"
would "consume the whole power of the reviewing court," in either
case Professor Davis's "difficult problem" vanishes. His "solution"
is not dictated by logical or practical necessity but by his desire to
carve out an exception from the unqualified directive of Section 10(e)
for such cases as he considers "intrinsically unsuited" to review.
47 To
accomplish this he redefines the word "committed," ordinarily defined
as "entrusted to": if action is "committed" to agency discretion, he
says, it is "unreviewable," if it is "unreviewable" it is "committed"-
in the context of Section 10 "the two words have the same meaning."4
This arbitrary redefinition of a statutory term to suit his purposes is
without a leg to stand on.49
Besides the logic of the statute and traditional judicial usage, there
are other considerations which militate against the Davis "solution."
The Supreme Court has stated that exemptions from the APA-here
from the express Section 10(e) directive--"are not lightly to be pre-
sumed."50 In addition there is the "presumption that arbitrariness is
reviewable unless there is 'evidence to the contrary' that Congress
of the 'except' clause." Davis, Supplement 17. Can he mean that "literally" the exception
for "discretion" forecloses review, for example, of Section 10(e)(2) action "contrary to
constitutional right?" See Appendix note 14 infra.
46. See Appendix note 14 infra.
47. "[IMjuch administrative discretion is intrinsically unsuited to judicial review." Da-
vis, Supplement 25.
48. The main idea is to emphasize the word "committed." So far as the action is by
law "committed" to agency discretion, it is not reviewable, even for arbitrariness or
abuse of discretion; it is not "committed" to agency discretion to the extent that it
is reviewable. This means that the two concepts "committed to agency discretion"
and "unreviewable" have in this limited context the same meaning. Both depend
upon the statutes and the common law. To the extent that "the law" cuts off review
for abuse of discretion, the action is committed to agency discretion. The result is
that the pre-act law on this point continues.
Davis, Postscript 825.
49. His redefinition is not, however, altogether without precedent: "'When I use a
word,' Humpty-Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I dcootc it to
mean-neither more nor less." L. CARRoLL, THROUGH THE LoomIxG GLASS ch. 6. But the
"plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curi-
ous, narrow, hidden sense." Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co. 267 U.S. .64, 370 (1925); see
Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932).
50. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1936). Then too, "However inclu-
sive may be the general language of a statute it will not be held to appl) to a matter
specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment .... Specific terms prevail
over the general." Fourco Glass Co. v. Transnirra Products Co., 353 U.S. 2.., 228-29
(1957).
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Iwished to close the door.' " Professor Davis states, "This is my position
too,"5 ' as well he may, for the presumption bears the imprimatur of
the Supreme Court: "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing
evidence' of contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access
to judicial review. "5 2 Since he confessedly does "not base [his] position
upon the legislative history," but "upon an effort to find a sound
solution";5 3 since, in his own words, his "solution" is no more than
"a practical interpretation which will carry out the probable intent";,'
since he now concedes, "I do not say that the statutory words require
my interpretation. Nor do I say that the legislative history must be
interpreted my way";5 5 and since he claims no more than that "taken
as a whole, [the legislative history] is not inconsistent with my solu-
tion;5 6 where is the "clear and convincing" congressional "evidence to
the contrary" which alone can rebut the presumption for review and
"close the door" to review?57
In fact, Professor Davis's reading of "committed" is inconsistent
with the legislative history.58 Let me dwell at this juncture only on
materials which bear directly on the word "committed." Early in the
legislative process there was concern whether the "committed" phrase
made it clear that only "abuse of discretion granted by law" was re-
viewable,59 exhibiting, first, an understanding that "committed" merely
51. Davis, Postscript 880 n.35.
52. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
53. Davis, Postscript 828.
54. Id. 825.
55. Id.
56. Id. 828. Before he was called to account, he asserted that the "words of the Act,
after all, are clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal"; that "the strongest part" of thelegislative history supported his reading; that the second exception was "a clear exptres.
sion of Congress in favor of preventing review"; and that "the courts uniformly read thisprovision literally, because they believe that Congress intended what it so clearly said."
Davis, Supplement 19, 18, 25. His was "the orthodox interpretation of § 10." Id. 24.Since then he has returned to his original view, saying: "The Berger interpretation ofthe APA has nothing against it except the clear statutory words . Davis, Not Always
644. See also Appendix note 14 infra.
57. See also note 6 supra. In addition, one who would cut down the plain Section
10(e) directive labors under a heavy burden. As Chief Justice Marshall said: "[I]f the plainmeaning of a provision ... is to be disregarded, because we believe that the framers of
the instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity andinjustice of applying the provision to the case would be ... monstrous .... " Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03 (1819). "If the text be clear and distinct,no restriction upon its plain and obvious import ought to be admitted, unless the In-
ference be irresistible." Martin v. Hunters' Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 804, 838-9 (1816)
(Story, J.).
58. See pp. 978-79 infra.
59. Emphasis added.
It is proposed that the phrase "by law committed to agency discretion" might be
clarified to indicate that judicial review is conferred only to correct an "abuse of
discretion granted by law." So far as necessary, the matter may be explained by com-
mittee report.
S. Doc. No. 248, at 36.
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meant "granted," its traditional meaning, and second, an understand-
ing that discretion "granted [i.e., "committed"] by law" might be
abused and would then be reviewable. The leading Senate proponent of
the APA, Chairman McCarran, explained shortly after enactment that
"committed by law" means, "of course, that claimed discretion must
have been intentionally given to the agency by the Congress, rather
than assumed by it." "Abuse of discretion," he continued, "is expressly
made reviewable" by Section 10(e).60 In short, "by law committed"
simply means "granted" or "entrusted with,"'61 not "unreviewable,"
as is confirmed by the face of the statute: "discretion" "by law com-
mitted" cannot comprehend "abuse of discretion," which Congress
stamped as "not in accordance with law."
0 2
The Davis "solution" suffers from yet another infirmity, deriving
from the fact that it "depend[s] upon statutes and the common law."'
He cites no case which does not turn on an interpretation of a statutory
grant of administrative jurisdiction, and his assertion of a "common
law" of nonreviewable arbitrariness boils down to judicial construc-
dons of such statutory grants. 4 But if a statute expressly bars review,
the matter is covered by the first exception of Section 10 for cases in
which "statutes preclude review"; and if judicial construction of a
statute bars review, this is "inexplicit" preclusion which is also covered
by the first exception. 65 Consequently a construction of the second
exception to preserve statutes which (allegedly) preclude review of
arbitrariness is supererogatory. Professor Davis's argument that there
is an "overlap" between the first and second exceptions
0 not only
60. McCarran, Improving "Administrative Justice": Hearings and Evidence; Scope of
Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A.J. 827, 831 (1946).
61. This normal employment of "committed" is also found in Wilson v. State Board
of Examination, 228 Mich. 25, 27, 19 N.V. 643, 644 (1924): to such Boards is "committed
the exercise of a sound discretion, but to them is not committed the exercise of an arbi-
trary will." In NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1950), the court said: "The
question of a proper unit... is committed to the wide discretion of the Board. The Board's
determination . . . will not be disturbed by the courts unless dearly arbitrary and
unreasonable."
62. See p. 971 infra.
63. See note 48 supra.
64. Compare his "when another statute is doubtful as to reviewability, the APA may
assist in an interpretation in favor of reviewability." Davis, Supplement 24.
65. Professor Davi5 describes Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 US.
297 (1943), as "the most important case holding that a statute inexplicitly precluded
review" under the first exception. 4 DAvis, TREATISx § 28.09, at 42.
66. Davis, Not Always 652 n.30. Professor Davis persists in maintaining that the "two
exceptions dearly overlap," id., without taking account of my demonstration that bis i u .
is untenable. Berger, Sequel 622-23, 628-30. Reiteration without refutation smacks of papal
infallibility.
The first exception preserves existing statutes such as the Veterans Administration Act.
which provides in certain cases that no court shall have jurisdiction to review. See p.
993 infra. The second exception merely insures that a sound exercise of di=cretion shall
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attributes to Congress special anxiety to shield selected arbitrariness
from review, for which there is not a shred of evidence in the legislative
history, 7 but also establishes a perplexing dual set of standards for
reviewability. The test of nonreviewability under the first exception
is stated by the House Report: "To preclude judicial review under
this bill a statute, if not specific in withhholding such review, must
upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to with-
hold it."6S The proposed Davis test under the second exception is
whether the function in question is "intrinsically unsuited" for ju-
dicial review.69 Professor Davis maintains that "nothing of substance
hinges on the classification" between the first and second exceptions, 0
but he has yet to explain why in that case Congress should have pro.
vided two disparate standards of review, unaccompanied by clues as
to the governing standard for a case of "overlapping."
III. The Legislative History
We have seen Chairman McCarran's assurance to Senator Donnell
that grants of "discretion" were "not intended" to preclude review
of arbitrariness, his subsequent explanation of "committed to discre-
tion" in terms of grant, and his statement that "abuse of discretion
is expressly made reviewable by Section 10(e)." 71 In the House, Chair-
man Walter said of the discretion of administrative agencies: "They
do not have the authority in any case to act blindly or arbitrarily. '7 2
remain unreviewable; it does not provide that arbitrariness shall not be reviewable, nor
that the court is without all jurisdiction in the premises. Professor Davis argues, "When-
ever a statute cuts off review of a discretionary determination, I think the statue precludes
review . . . ." Davis, Not Always 652 n.30. This is to reason that because apples and
oranges are both fruit they are therefore identical. Since every agency is created by statute
and must of necessity have discretion, whether or not conferred in terms, it follows in
the Davis lexicon that every statute must prevent review. On that analysis the first excep.
tion is supererogatory. If, on the other hand, we adopt Professor Davis's reading of "com-
mitted to discretion" as providing for selective unrevsewability by virtue of prior statutes
such situations would be covered by the first exception, because a "statute precludes
review." It is a common-place that one avoids constructions that result in surplusage or
tautology. Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F.2d 166, 172 (8th Cir. 1938).
67. Professor Davis himself states that "of course, everyone, Including every court,
shares Mr. Berger's opposition to administrative arbitrariness." Davis, Supplement 17.
68. S. Doc. 248, at 275. See also Chairman Walter's explanation, quoted in note 6 supra.
69. Davis, Supplement 25.
70. Davis, Not Always 652 n.30. Compare Mr. Saferstein: "there is little to be gained
by attempting to distinguish between the committed-to-agency-discretion doctrine and the
second [actually the first] nonreviewability exception codified in § 10 . . . where 'statutes
preclude judicial review.'" Saferstein 377 n.43.
71. See pp. 972, 977 supra.
72. S. Doc. No. 248, at 368 (emphasis added). Another spokesman for the bill, Con-
gressman Springer, in explaining the purpose of the Section 10(e) provision stated:
In those cases where these decisions are found to be arbitrary, where the decision Is
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Consider Professor Davis's comment on Walter's explanation of the
APA:
However reasonable this proposition may seem, if it means that
courts may always set aside blind or arbitrary action, it is incon-
sistent with tradition and with the unambiguous words of the
Act providing for review "except so far as ...agency action is
by law committed to agency discretion." 3
Since Professor Davis no longer claims that the "exception" is "un-
ambiguous,"74 we may turn to his "tradition." He himself has said that
"Congress has power within reasonable limits to determine" "what
administrative action shall be reviewable"; and it can scarcely be
maintained that an Act which implements the "laudable purpose" of
"reducing injustice by allowing the courts to correct administrative
arbitrariness or abuse of discretion"75 is unreasonable. Congress may
supplant either the common law or a "tradition" by statute; the only
question is whether it has expressed its intention to do so. For that
expression we have the truly "unambiguous" Section 10(e) directive
to set arbitrariness aside, amplified by Chairman Walter's statement
that it was applicable "in any case," and Congressman Springer's
statement that the directive expressed a "sound philosophy."70 'What-
ever the scope of the alleged "tradition," the first duty of the courts
is to give effect to the plain terms of the statute, particularly since they
are confirmed by a clear legislative history."7
Originally Professor Davis charged me with ignoring "the strongest
part" of the legislative history which allegedly "supports [his] literal
reading";78 but he has retreated from this position. Now his purpose
in presenting "the legislative history opposed to Mr. Berger's position
... is not to show that it leads to a conclusion against Berger," but
found to be capricious or an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with
the law, the decision can be set aside. That is certainly fair. that is certainly equit-
able, and is certainly based upon a sound philosophy.
S. Doc. No. 248, at 377. To carve out exceptions from the "sound philosophy" of the
general rule more is needed than vague references to an intention to "preserve discretion.
'
See Appendix, pp. 1001-1003 infra.
73. 4 DAvis, TREAr sE § 28.08, at 39.
74. See p. 976 supra.
75. Davis, Supplement 25.
76. See note 72 supra.
77. The House Report alone would refute Mr. Saferstein's "doctrine" of "refusal to
hear an allegation" of arbitrariness, Saferstein 368 n.5 (emphasis added): "In any case
the existence of discretion does not prevent a person from bringing a review action but
merely prevents him pro tanto from prevailing therein." S. Doc. No. 248. at 275 (emphasis
added). In other words, the second exception does not bar a "hearing" of charges of
arbitrary conduct even though the litigant may fail to establish arbitrariness "therein."
78. Davis, Supplement 18.
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merely to "show that it is conflicting." Now the legislative history
invoked by him merely "seems to [him] rather substantial, just as the
legislative history in support of Mr. Berger's position is rather sub-
stantial." 79 In fact, his selective unreviewability gloss finds no support
in the history. The excerpts he invokes merely amount to this: "by
law committed" means "by law committed" and nothing more; "dis-
cretion" must be "preserved."80 Of course "discretion" must be pre-
served; but where is one scrap of evidence that some "abuse of dis-
cretion" must be preserved as well? Under established judicial usage
"discretion" is "preserved" even though "abuse of discretion" is made
reviewable. The legislative history plainly confirms what Section 10
provides: only the exercise of "sound" discretion was sheltered by the
second exception; the directive to set arbitrariness aside was left
untouched.
IV. Constitutional Requirements
"The most extreme of all Berger positions," says Professor Davis,
"is that the Constitution requires review of arbitrariness. No case sup-
ports him."8' Let me summarize some of the cases that I spread before
him. A provision that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, said Justice William Johnson in 1819, was "intended to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government."8 2 There followed cases in which the Court stated that
(1) our institutions "do not mean to leave room for the play and
action of purely personal and arbitrary power."8' 8 (2) The Constitu-
tion condemns "all arbitrary exercise of power."84 (3) A state gov-
ernor's order "may not stand if it is an act of mere oppression, an
79. Davis, Postscript 826, 727. Mr. Saferstein echoes that "the legislative history does
provide some support for Berger's position, although it appears that many committee mem-
bers confused nonreviewability with scope of review." Saferstein 374. It is true that the Section
19(e) directive to set arbitrary action aside comes under the head "Scope of Review," but
Senator Donnell, for example, required express assurance that review of arbitrariness was
unaffected by the exception. See p. 972 supra. Unless there is a "Right to Review" of
arbitrariness, the directive under "Scope of Review" is without force.
80. See Appendix, pp. 1001-03 infra.
81. Davis, Not Always 644.
82. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819). Justice James Wil.
son, who was second only to Madison among the Framers, M. FARRAND, FRAMING OF Tilt
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STArES 197 (1913), said in 1791: "Every wanton ...or un-
necessary act of authority . . .over the citizen, is wrong, and unjustifiable, anti tyran.
nical." 2 J. WILSON, WORKS 393 (Andrews ed. 1896). Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
539 (1934), stated that arbitrary control is "an unnecessary and unwarranted interference
with individual liberty."
83. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
84. ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913).
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arbitrary fiat."8 5 (4) In 1965 the Court declared, "delegated power, of
course, may not be exercised arbitrarily."80 (5) The Court has epito-
mized due process as the "protection of the individual against arbitrary
action."8 17 In an uncontentious moment Professor Davis himself stated,
"The requirement of reasonableness stems both from the idea of con-
stitutional due process and from the idea of statutory interpretation
that legislative bodies are assumed to intend to avoid the delegation of
power to act unreasonably."88 Professor Davis concedes that this is an
"impressive collection of Supreme Court statements," but goes on:
I agree with those statements; I do not see how anyone could
disagree with them. But they do not prove that arbitrary exercise
of power is always reviewable. One of Mr. Berger's pervasive
mistakes is to equate lack of authority to act arbitrarily with
judicial reviewability.8 9
The Court is hardly to be charged with idle utterance of noble senti-
ments which it means to be unenforceable. In fact, after stating that
"There is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of
arbitrary power," the Court went on to say, "if the Secretary has
exceeded the authority conferred upon him by law, then there is
power in the courts to restore the status of the parties aggrieved by
such unwarranted action,"90 as Yick Wo had earlier taught in setting
85. Summary of Sterling v. Constantin, 287 US. 378 (1932), by Justice Cardozo in
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 446 (1935) (dissenting opinion).
86. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965).
87. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937); cf. Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889): "IThe great purpose of the requirement [of due
process] is to exclude everything that is arbitrary and capricious in legislation affecting
the rights of the citizen." Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 D.C. Cir. 1935): The
government "must not act arbitrarily, for . . . it is subject to the requirements of due
process of law."
88. 1 DAvis, TREATISE § 5.03, at 299. In fact legislative bodies arc without constitutional
power to make such delegations. In the Japanese Immigrant Case. 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903),
the Court indicated that an Act which vested officials with "absolute arbitrary power"
would be unconstitutional. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 (186), held unconstitu-
tional an ordinance that conferred a "naked and arbitrary powver." See also Lewis v.
District of Columbia, 190 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1951). quoted at note 115 infra.
I have found but one departure from such utterances, Chief Justice white's statement
in Dakota Central Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919): "[M]ere excess or
abuse of discretion in exerting a power given, it is clear ... involves considerations which
are beyond the reach of judicial power." His view has been refuted by later Supreme
Court practice to the contrary. See note 11 supra, note 145 infra. Today judicial review of
arbitrariness is an accomplished fact, as the annotations to Section 10 abundantly testify.
1 FiE. P.Ac. DiG., Administrative Law § 761 (1960).
Professor Davis was in any case ill-advised to cite Chief Justice White, Davis, Not Always
644, because he himself rejects total unreviewability of arbitrariness in favor of selective unrc-
viewability, id. 646, whereas White would have outlawed all review.
89. Davis, Not Always 646.
90. Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby. 211, US. 249, 262 (1908).
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aside an arbitrary ordinance, 91 and as the third case quoted above
reiterates. Moreover, the Court has stated that it would not leave an
individual "to the absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of...
[an] administrative officer." 92 "Where administrative action has raised
serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Con-
gress... intended to afford those affected by the action the traditional
safeguards of due process.' ' 9a "To stand between the individual
and arbitrary action by the Government," said Justice Jackson, "is
the highest function of this Court." 93 The "very essence of civil lib-
erty," said Chief Justice Marshall, "certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws."9 4 Otherwise the
protection afforded by due process against arbitrary conduct would be
but an empty shell.9 5
In conceding that arbitrary action is indeed unauthorized, Professor
91. See note 83 supra.
92. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110 (1902). Sum-
marizing the Chinese and Japanese immigration cases, Professor Hart found judicial recog-
nition that a "plenary" power
did not necessarily include a power to be arbitrary or to authorize administrative
officials to be arbitrary . .. [and that] the court had a responsibility to see that ...
human beings were not unreasonably subjected, even by direction of Congress, to
an uncontrolled official discretion.
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HAtv. L. Rv. 1362, 1390 (1953).
92a. Green v. McElroy, 360 US. 474, 507 (1959).
93. Statement accompanying a stay of deportation of Mrs. Ellen Knauff, issued as
Circuit Justice of the 2d Circuit, May 17, 1950. W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAIw: CASES AND COrMENTS 814 (4th ed. 1960). The role of the Court "in protecting the
individual against arbitrary action by the state," is noted by Rostow, The Supreme Court
and the People's Will, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 573, 592-93 (1958).
The Framers, said the Court in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126 (1866), "were
guarding the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power"; they
sought to protect the "citizen against oppression and wrong." For historical documentation,
see R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 16-21 (to be published; Harvard University
Press 1969).
94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 160 (1803). As the Court said In United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882): "It cannot be denied that [the rights of the citizen]
were intended to be enforced by the judiciary." "[T]here is no safety for the citizen, except
in the protection of judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded by the officers
of the government ..... Id. at 219. In American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
187 U.S. 94, 110 (1902), the Court said that courts must have the "power ... to grant relicf"
to protect against "uncontrolled and arbitrary action." See also Bradley v. Richmond,
227 U.S. 477, 483 (1913).
In a suit for the return of property seized by the government as allegedly enemy.owned
during World War I, the Supreme Court held that the Trading with the Enemy Act would
have been of doubtful constitutioriality had it failed to supply an adequate remedy to the
non-enemy owner. Constitutional rights must be afforded vindication. Becker Steel Co. v.
Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 79 (1935).
95. Judge Jerome Frank stated: "It is idle chatter to speak of a legal wrong for which
there is no legal redress; a so-called legal right without a legal remedy is ... but a shabby
mythical entity." Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d 192, 205 n.37 (2d Cir.
1941). Quoting Blackstone, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "[I]t is a general and indisputable
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy ..... Marbury v,
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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Davis implies what Section 10(e) makes explicit-that arbitrary action
is "not in accordance with law."901 It follows that such action is without
"due process of law" in its primal sense:
[when the great barons of England wrung from King John ...
the concession that neither their lives nor their property should
be disposed of by the crown, except as provided by the law of the
land, they meant by "law of the land" the ancient and customary
laws of the English people, or laws enacted by the Parliament, of
which the barons were a controlling element. 7
Injury not authorized by the Constitution is therefore contrary to the
"law of the land" and is forbidden by due process.
Next Professor Davis maintains that
[t]hroughout our history, the Supreme Court has held some ad-
ministrative action unreviewable for arbitrariness or abuse. In the
foundation case in 1827, the Court refused to review a finding of
fact and declared: "It is no answer that such a power may be
abused, for there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse."9 8
But actual as against possible abuse was something else again, for the
Founders looked to the courts to protect the citizen against govern-
mental excesses or "abuse of power"; 9 and the incautious 1827
statement is repudiated by widespread current review of arbitrariness.
But first let us look at Professor Davis's "foundation case," Martin v.
Mott,00 which involved a statute authorizing the President to call forth
the state militia whenever the United States "shall be invaded, or be in
imminent danger of invasion." Understandably the Court refused to
review the President's finding of fact. The most ardent proponent of
judicial review must shrink from halting the President to allow
lawyers to wrangle over the imminence of an invasion threat. 'While
they squabbled the nation might be overrun. Today we should regard
such an issue as a "political question," of necessity confided to the
sole determination of President and Congress. Such extreme cases can-
not justify a general "principle" of nonreview of arbitrariness or
abuse. Commenting on the twentieth century case of American School
of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 01 Professor Davis himself states:
96. See pp. 980-81 supra.
97. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877). 1 comment below on the excep-
tional cases which Davis apparently considers as floating in a no man's land outside the
Constitution.
98. Davis, Not Always 644.
99. See note 93 supra & note 190 infra.
100. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31 (1827).
101. 187 US. 94 (1902).
983
The Yale Law Journal
"Instead of saying, as it had said in 1827, that 'it is no answer that
such a power may be abused . . .' the Court now assumes that 'ar-
bitrary action' must be judicially corrected."'1 °2 "The common law,"
he notes, "was evidently changing."'10 3
Another case cited by Davis is Keim v. United States,
04 wherein
the discharge of a government employee was held unreviewable.
This case, he states, "is still the foundation of the law concerning the
removal of federal employees."' 5 Again he himself shakes the au-
thority of his citation: "Even though the Court held in the Keim
case of 1900 that discharge of a federal employee was not reviewable,
many cases in recent times have held or assumed that such discharges
are reviewable."' 0 6
In a third attempt to minimize the "impressive collection of Su-
preme Court statements" with which he purportedly agrees, Professor
Davis invokes Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks Association
v. Employees Association,0 7 as "[p]erhaps the most important single case
against Berger's view that arbitrariness is always reviewable and that
the Constitution requires reviewability."''
0 In part Professor Davis
relies on Brotherhood because "the Court did not even mention ...
[Berger's] view that cutting off review would be unconstitutional.
' '10
Nonmention of a constitutional question in a case affords a dubious
base upon which to build constitutional doctrine;"
0 and it can hardly
weigh in the scales with unequivocal Supreme Court statements that
arbitrariness is beyond the pale.
Professor Davis also relies on the fact that the complaint was dis-
missed without review on the merits, in spite of allegations that both
the denial of the petition involved and the form of ballot used had
102. 4 DAVIS, TREATISE § 28.04, at 15.
103. Id. 17. Reliance on "superseded" cases by others is viewed with disfavor by Davis:
"Jaffe should have found the many later cases that superseded the cases ne cites.' Davis,
"Judicial Control of Administrative Action": A Review, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 635, 663 (1966).
104. 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
105. Davis, Not Always 650 n. 15.
106. 4 DAvis, TREAxraE § 28.05, at 18. Notable among such cases are Service v. Dulles,
354 U.S. 363 (1957), and Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959). In this area courts will"guard against arbitrary or capricious action." McTiernan v. Gronouski, 337 F.2d 31, 34
(2d Cir. 1964): Brown v. Zuckert, 349 F.2d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 1965).
107. 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
108. Davis, Not Always 645. It should be noted that the Brotherhood case involved not
the second exception, for "discretion," but the first exception, for cases in which "statutes
preclude judicial review," which raises entirely different questions.
109. Davis, Not Always 651 n.20 (emphasis added).
110. The Court has often rejected arguments, for example, that the issue of jurisdiction
was settled because the Court had proceeded in earlier cases without noticing it. Ayr-
shire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 331 U.S. 132, 137 n.2 (1947); United States v. More,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805).
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been "arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory.""' Nothing in the case
suggests, however, that the Court's decision was anything more than
the normal determination that the agency's action fell within the
bounds of rational choice. The Court rejected the allegation that the
denial of the petition had been arbitrary by finding the contention
that the "Board ignored an express command of the Act" to be "com-
pletely devoid of merit.""' In rejecting the allegation in the complaint
that "the form of ballot . . . is arbitrary," the Court did say that
"[t]he Board's choice of its proposed ballot is not subject to judicial
review .... .113 But the Court also stated that "there is nothing to
suggest that in framing [the ballot] the Board exceeded its statutory
authority," and that the Board had been "careful to provide fair, yet
effective procedures." 14 These statements preclude any inference that
the Board may be arbitrary in choosing a ballot, and make it clear that
the Brotherhood case is no exception either to the Court's subsequent
statement that "delegated power, of course, may not be exercised
arbitrarily,"" 65 or to the general rule that arbitrariness is reviewable.
Thus the "most important single case against Berger's view" will not
support the inferences Professor Davis would wrest from it.
In harmony with his general emphasis on considerations of agency
and court convenience rather than upon the rights of those adversely
affected by agency action, Mr. Saferstein relegates consideration of
my constitutional arguments to a footnote. "Berger," he remarks,
"also makes a constitutional argument, which seems to say that a
claim of abuse of discretion always rises to constitutional magni-
tude."" 6 "[I]f a broad definition of 'abuse' is meant," he says, apparently
with "unwise use" or some equivalent in mind, "it is unlikely that
most alleged abuses will rise to such a level." 17 If the normal nar-
rower meaning governs, however, Mr. Saferstein's objections fade.
Apparently he approves Judge Friendly's suggestion that an abuse
of discretion standard can be used as a criterion for review if defined
111. Davis, Not Always 645.
112. 380 U.S. at 671.
113. Davis, Not Always 645.
114. 380 U.S. at 67.
115. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965). Davis himself states that "the courts
have held administrative action ... (2) unrevi-wable except on constitutional and judicial
questions." 4 DAvis, TRan.SE § 28.02, at 6. Arbitrary action, concededly unauthorized
by the Constitution, presents a "constitutional question." Compare Lewis v. District of
Columbia, 190 F.2d 25, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1951): "The action of . . . administrative officers, is
not to be declared unconstitutional unless the court is convinced that it is 'dearly arbitrary
and unreasonable.'" See also note 88 supra.
116. Saferstein 373 n.31.
117. Id.
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to cover only actions alleged to be "arbitrary, fanciful, or unreason-
able, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only
where no reasonable man would take the view."
118 "With this narrow
scope of review," says Mr. Saferstein, "an allegation of abuse arguably
could always be reviewed without the balance between the individual
and the institutions being upset." 1 9 From the very beginning I em-
phasized that the terms "abuse of discretion" and "arbitrary, capri-
cious action" are used interchangeably by the courts,
1'20 and my concern
has always and explicity been with "Administrative Arbitrariness."
Consequently my views do fall within the "narrow" Friendly formula-
tion, and as Mr. Saferstein recognizes, the "narrow standard [does]
require at the least a summary review of the administrative action."
121
But Mr. Saferstein leaves his position on the constitutional argu-
ment in some confusion, for he maintains that whether the definition
of abuse be "broad" or "narrow," and "granting that judicial relief
is often guaranteed on certain allegations," "there is no reason to be-
lieve that such a right [of judicial review] would not depend-as do
so many constitutional rights-upon a balancing process . . . between
the individual and the institutional interests."'
21 "2 And he states that
"the committed-to-agency-discretion doctrine . . . usually yields to
nonfrivolous constitutional claims such as those of deprivation of prop-
erty and liberty without due process."'1
2 3 If this is designed to differen-
tiate deprivation of "due process" from what Justice Jackson called its
chief object, to protect the individual against governmental arbitrari-
ness, 2 4 Mr. Saferstein is badly mistaken.
In deciding on the merits in a given case whether there was ar-
bitrariness, possibly the court may "balance" the individual interest
against institutional interests, though one may doubt whether a little
bit of arbitrariness should be better sheltered than a little bit of
rape. 2 5 Constitutional rights would be in parlous straits were they
118. Id. 375-76.
119. Id. 376.
120. Berger, Article 57. See also note 22 supra.
121. Saferstein 377.
122. Id. 373 n.31.
123. Id. 369-70.
124. See pp. 980, 982 supra.
125. Professor Bickel criticizes Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886 (1961), in which the discharge of a short-order cook at a naval gun factory was
sustained on "security" grounds:
it is surely startling to encounter the constitutional principle that the government
must grant hearings to private persons before inflicting palpable injury, except that
it need not do so when the injury, though undoubted and bitterly complained of,
seems slight.
A. BIcKL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 168 (1962). See also note 82 supra.
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left at the mercy of untested assertions of "frivolity," or of preliminary
judicial "balancing" to determine whether there has been enough
injury to a constitutional right to entitle the individual to complain
and be heard. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court has stated the
rule: "It is to be presumed in favor of the jurisdiction of the Court
that the plaintiff may be able to prove the right which he asserts in
his declaration."' ' And the constitutional ban on arbitrariness, I
submit, bars Mr. Saferstein's doctrine of "nonreview" couched in
terms of "a refusal to hear an allegation against any part of an agency
determination.' 127
Nor should "excessive cost" to the agency or the courts1' be "bal-
anced" against invasion of the constitutional right to be protected
against unreasonable officialdom. "Due process" can hardly be denied
because protection is "inconvenient." "We must not," said the Second
Circuit, "play fast and loose with basic constitutional rights in the in-
terest of administrative efficiency."'-' 0 Indeed, the Senate Report stated
that the APA "must reasonably protect private parties even at the
risk of some incidental or possible inconvenience to or change in pres-
ent administrative operations."' 30 When Mr. Saferstein concludes that
"to demand that courts give review whenever a complaint utters the
formula 'abuse of discretion' is to hazard a serious misallocation of
judicial resources as well as a stifling of agency and congressional pro-
grams,"' 31 he posits that man exists for the state rather than, as our
Founders conceived, that the state exists for the protection of the in-
dividual. In the Convention, James Wilson asked, "Will a regard to
126. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219 (1882). Where "there is a prima fade show-
ing of arbitrariness ... the injured party is entitled to be heard." Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d
96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
127. Saferstein 368 (emphasis added). The legislative history shows Congress had no
such "refusal" in mind. Note 77 supra.
128. See the editors' summary of Mr. Saferstein's artide, 82 HARv. L. REv. 367.
129. United States v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 1957) (Nedina, J.) (refusal to reject
habeas corpus on ground it was improbable petitioner would be able to prove his asser-
tions). See also Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961) (rejecting argument
that "if a hearing is ordered in this instance it will encourage a flood of such petitions").
The Supreme Court said of a denaturalization based upon prolonged residence in the
country of origin that such legislation touching on the "most precious rights" of citizen-
ship would have to be justified under the foreign relations power "by sonic more urgent
public necessity than substituting administrative convenience for the individual right of
which the citizen is deprived." Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 167 (1964).
130. S. Doc. No. 248, at 191. Application of Mr. Saferstein's elaborate criteria for making
a preliminary determination whether to review arbitrariness, Saferstein 371-95, would bog
the courts down far more than a determination whether the facts make out unreasonable
conduct. Compare Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1966): "a review of re-
fusals to reopen necessarily limited to abuse of discretion, would impose a relatively
slight burden on the agency and the courts." (Friendly, J.)
131. Saferstein 375.
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state rights justify the sacrifice of the rights of men?" 182 And as Justice
Wilson, he declared in his 1791 Lecture that the purpose of this
"magnificent" "structure of government" was for the accommodation
"of the sovereign, Man," and that the "primary and principal object"
was "to acquire a new security" for his rights.133 In large part judicial
review owes its being to the Founders' anxiety for the protection of
private rights; and it would be a betrayal of judicial responsibility
were the courts to bow out on the plea that they are too busy to afford
such protection.
Mr. Saferstein is also troubled by the "uncertainties in defining
and applying an abuse-of-discretion standard in the past"; it is not
clear, he says, quoting Judge Friendly, "precisely what this [standard]
means."'1 34 One can categorize some types of arbitrariness on the basis
of the cases, 135 but it is true that "No standard or measuring stick has
been or can be devised that may be successfully applied in all cases." 130
That difficulty, however, is no greater than that of defining the myriad
varieties of "unreasonable" conduct in negligence cases, or of deter-
mining when a restraint of trade is "unreasonable" in an antitrust
case; yet no attempt to wall off the assertion of such claims has been
made in those fields. Lack of tidy definition pervades the entire do-
main of due process itself, 37 but no one suggests that the enforcement
of due process must therefore be abandoned or curtailed. In practice,
courts have experienced no great difficulty in recognizing "arbitrary"
conduct, which must strike a court as "unreasonable" in all the cir-
cumstances.
V. Professor Davis's Codification Argument
Unlike Mr. Saferstein, Professor Davis does not claim that his as
yet unborn "committed" "solution" was codified in 1946. Instead he
relies on the "1966 codification of the APA" as a "conclusive" demon-
stration that his view had been "codified," invoking the rephrased
statement that judicial review does not apply to "agency action . . .
132. 1 M. FARRAND, THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 491 (1911).
In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419, 468 (1793), Justice Cushing declared that
the "great end and object of [states] must be, to secure and support the rights of individuals,
or else, vain is government." See also note 190 infra.
133. 2 J. WILSON, WoRmS 453-54 (Andrews ed. 1896).
134. Saferstein 376 & n.39.
135. Berger, Article 82.
136. In re Albert Dickinson Co., 104 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1939).
137. Compare Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954), employing a "fair play" test of
due process. "Fair play" is no more precise a standard than "unreasonable" action.
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committed to agency discretion by law."' 38 But for the transfer of the
words "by law" from the original "committed by law" to the end of
the phrase, and substitution of "to the extent that" for "so far as," the
"codified" exception is in relevant part identical with that of 1 946.:la0
Nevertheless Professor Davis affirms: "The codifiers have taken my
view.... [T]heir view is the law because Congress has enacted it."' 
0
This is his entire argument.
Simple retention of the original "committed" phrase does not spell
approval of his artificial interpretation. Of course, "discretion," in
the sense employed by the courts, is unreviewable. But the codifiers
nowhere indicate that "abuse of discretion" or arbitrary action is also
unreviewable, in whole or in part. Professor Davis himself states that
"the theory of codification is that no substantive change is made, and
I agree with the codifiers that in this provision they have made no sub-
stantive change."'141 In that event, "codification" left him exactly
where it found him, struggling to impose his "solution" after enact-
ment. Once more refutation of Professor Davis may be based upon
his own text. Speaking of the related "reenactment rule"-the doc-
trine that subsequent reenactment of a statute constitutes adoption
of its administrative construction-he states: "Chief Justice Warren
quite accurately said for the Court in 1955 that "reenactment . . . is
an unreliable indicium at best."'1' ' "Whenever a congressional aware-
ness of the administrative interpretation does not appear, and seems
unlikely," states Professor Davis, "the basis for the reenactment rule
vanishes."' 43 There is not a scintilla of evidence that either Congress
or the codifiers were apprised of his "solution."
158. Davis, Not Always 644.
159. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), provided: "Except so far as
(1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion .... The 1966 codification, 80 Stat. 392, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1966), provides: "This
chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-(l) statutes
preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
140. Davis, Not Always 644. So sure is he that he has scored a stunning triumph that
he concludes: "This means that Berger's main position that the APA makes such action
reviewable becomes an unseemly posture of lying fiat on his back with all four wheels
spinning. The APA can have no effect on something to which it does not apply. The
codifiers have taken my view."
141. Id. 650 n.12.
142. 1 DAvIS, TREATISE § 5.07, at 333.
143. Id. 334. At 335 he states:
A 1957 decision of the Supreme Court refusing to apply the reenactment rule seems
especially encouraging and would be much more encouraging if only one could find
reason to believe that the Court would consistently follow it in the future: . . . "The
regulation had been in effect for only three years, and there is nothing to Indicate
that it was ever called to the attention of Congress. The reenactment . . . was not
accompanied by any congressional discussion which throws light on the intended scope.
In such circumstances we consider the 1951 reenactment to be without significance."
[United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359].
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Finally, discussing a Treasury Regulation in the frame of "reenact-
ment" he states in his text: "It was not and could not have been a
codification of judicial decisions, for the decisions were often conflict-
ing."'144 Viewed most favorably to Professor Davis, the best that can be
said of the decisions since 1946 is that they were "conflicting." By
far the largest number of cases unconcernedly declare arbitrariness
reviewable without so much as a glance at either the second exception
or the Davis "solution."'145 A few cases held that the discretion excep-
144. 1 DAvis, TREATisE § 5.05, at 321. The Court also stated in Jones v. Liberty Glass
Co., 332 U.S. 524, 534 (1947): "We do not expect Congress to make an affirmative move
every time a lower court indulges in an erroneous interpretation. In short, the original
legislative language speaks louder than such judicial action."
145. As in the case of the pre-1946 cases collected in note 11 supra, the vast majority
of post-1946 cases formulate the problem in the same earlier terms, e.g., search for a
"rational" basis, whether the action is "arbitrary or capricious" and the like.
Supreme Court: SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 208 (1947) ("breadth" of "discretion"
precludes review of the Commission's judgment "save where it has plainly abused its
discretion."); Niagara-Hudson Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336, 347 (1951) ("In the absence
of abuse of its discretion, the Commission's plan is . . . lawful and binding'); Gilbertville
Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 126 (1962) (review "limited to consideration
of whether [the order] has a rational basis"); Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission,
383 U.S. 607, 622 (1966) (facts not "sufficient to establish that the Commission abused its
discretion'). First Circuit: S.D. Warren Co. v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 814, 816 (1965) ("arbitrary
action" reviewable); Old Colony Furniture Co. v. United States, 95 F. Sipp. 507, 509
(D. Mass. 1951). Second Circuit: United States Lines Co. v. CAB, 165 F.2d 849, 852 (1948)
(no review absent "arbitrary exercise of discretion'); Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d
999, 1002 (1950) (court can compel "correction of an abuse of discretion"); Grace Line v.
Federal Maritime Bd., 263 F.2d 709, 711 (1959) (court must be satisfied "administrative
decision has a 'rational' or 'reasonable' foundation"); Wong Wing Iang v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 718 (1966) (Friendly, J.) ("only in the rare--some say
non-existent case ... may review for 'abuse' be precluded'). Third Circuit: NLRB v. J.H.
Matthews Co., 342 F.2d 129, 131 (1965) (action will be set aside as arbitrary if "not
supportable on any rational basis'); Dooley v. Highway Truckdrivers & Helpers, 192 F.
Supp. 198, 200 (D. Del. 1961) ("A reasonable determination is the antithesis of one which
is arbitrary"). Fourth Circuit: RFC v. Lightsey, 185 F.2d 167, 170 (1950) (conclusive unless
"arbitrary and capricious'). Fifth Circuit: Nadiak v. CAB, 305 F.2d 588, 593 (1962) (wide
discretion: review confined "to whether there was an abuse of discretion"); United States
v. Marshall Durbin Co., 363 F.2d 1, 5 (1966) ("If the order is arbitrary . . . judicial review
may be obtained'). Sixth Circuit: General Motors Corp. v. United States, 324 F.2d 604,
605 (1963) (action will be set aside if "arbitrary or capricious'). Seventh Circuit: United
States ex rel. Beck v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 221, 223 (1953) (court will set aside action for "mani!-
fest abuse of discretion'); Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282 F.2d 874, 876 (1960) (court will "exam-
ine the record to see whether discretion .. . has been abused'). Eighth Circuit: NLRB v.
Minnesota Mining 9- Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 323, 326 (1950) (Section 10(e) made no "material
change in the scope of review"; an order which is "arbitrary and capricious . . . may
always be set aside'); Irvin v. Hobby, 131 F. Supp. 851, 865 (N.D. Iowa 1955); NLRB v.
Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126, 129 (1950); Jenkins v. Macy, 237 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Mo. 1961)
(re Section 10(e): "As long as the administrative agency . . . had a sound basis for the
decision made, and the decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion...
then the courts will not substitute their own decision"). Tenth Circuit: NLRB v. Con-
tinental Oil Co., 179 F.2d 552, 554 (1950) (action will be set aside if "arbitrary or capri-
cious'); Smaldone v. United States, 211 F.2d 161, 163 (1954) (discretion "means sound dis-
cretion . . . not discretion exercised arbitrarily'); Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Anderson, 75
F. Supp. 363, 368 (D. Kan. 1947) (discretion "not subject to judicial control unless abused
or exercised arbitrarily or capriciously'). District of Columbia Circuit: Eustace v. Day,
314 F.2d 247 (1962) (court will "not substitute its own judgment" if "there is a rational
basis" for the conclusion); American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp.
346, 349 (1953) ("One of [the APA] purposes was to enlarge the authority of the
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tion, without qualification, cuts off review of abuse of discretion.1 40
One case accepted his "solution," and a couple paid it lip service,147
courts to check illegal and arbitrary administrative action'). Court of Claims: Gadsden v.
United States, 78 F. Supp. 126, 127 (1948) ("In innumerable cases it has been held that
where discretion is conferred ... if [a decision] is arbitrary and capricous... the courts
have power to review it and set it aside'); Wales v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 900, 904
(1955) ("The doors of this court are always open to grant relief' against "arbitrary and
capricious" action).
146. United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1964), does not
rely on Professor Davis but concludes that the discretion exception cuts off review of abuse
of discretion on the ground that "we have no right to disregard this plain language." See
also Pullman Trust & Savings Bank v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1964). It
should be noted that this is not the Davis view: Professor Davis argues only for selective
unreviewability. "Nothing in the legislative history supports all intent to deprive the
courts of all power to correct any abuse of discretion." Davis, Supplement 21. "My opinion
continues to be that under the APA administrative arbitrariness or abuse is sometimes
unreviewable." Davis, Not Always 643. He takes a "middle [position] between the courts
and Mr. Berger," stating that "some discretion is reviewable and some is not." Id. 646.
Since my position is that of the numerous courts cited in note 145 supra, Professor Davis
must refer by "courts" to the two cases cited in this footnote; these represent the "courts"
147. Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 194), where the court adopted the Davis
"solution" and became entangled in a maze in trying to apply it. See Berger, Reply 799-803.
With the exception of that case the Ninth Circuit has applied the general rule, as expressed
in notes 11 and 145 supra. Villapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676. 695 (9th Cir. 1949)
(question: "whether the order is a rational conclusion and not so unreasonable as to be capri-
cious, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion'); Western Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545, 551
(1950) (plaintiff can object to "clear abuse of discretion as the result of arbitrary or
capricious action'); Carlson v. Landon, 187 F.2d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1951) ("The judiciary
*.. must be alert to strike down all arbitrary action'). See also Adams v. Witner, 2071 F.2d
29,*33 (9th Cir. 1959). After Ferry v. Udall, the Ninth Circuit returned to this rule. Speaking
of the right of an entryman on public land, the court said: "This is precisely the kind
of right which the Administrative Procedure Act, With its provisions for judicial
review, was designed to safeguard from arbitrary, capricious and illegal deprivation." Cole-
man v. United States, 363 F.2d 190, 196 (9h Cir. 1966). And in Montgomery v. CIR,
367 F.2d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 1966), the court stated: "In the absence of a strong showing...
that such discretion has been abused, the charge must be rejected." In neither Coleman
nor Montgomery was reference made to the second exception or to the Ferry teetering
on the Davis "solution" as confined to "permissive" statutes.
Professor Davis states that First Nat'l. Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965),
"specifically adopts my analysis." Davis, Postscript 814. The court said:
Abundant authority, with which we agree, holds that the comptroller's determination
in the present area is not immunized from review by the exemption in the preface
of § 1009 ... [for agency discretion]. [His] discretion ... is not the t)pe of discretion
to which action has been "committed by law" but rather one of the character ex-
pressly made reviewable by § 1009(e).
352 F.2d at 270, citing Professor Davis. The court furnishes no clue to the criteria which
make arbitrariness nonreviewable; and such effect as Saxon may have is diluted by the
fact that the Fourth Circuit has since declared without reference either to Saxon or
Professor Davis that a court may reverse when an administrative decision is "arbitrary,
unreasonable, [or] capricious." Halsey v. Nitze, 390 F.2d 142, 144 (1968).
So too, the Eighth Circuit, after a line of orthodox statements, note 145 supra, said
respecting the Comptroller's "discretion":
[IJhe congressional grant of authority does not empower arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion, nor does it contemplate abuse of that discretion ....
... This holding we believe to be consistent with § 10 .... [N]or is this the t)pe of
agency action that is by law committed to agency discretion so as to be 'immunized
from review by the exception.'
Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 387, 388 (8th Cir. 1966). The court merely
cited First Nat'1 Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965). without affording any clue to
what was required to "immunize from review." On the other hand, tie court also stated:
"absent a congressional design to bar all judicial review [e.g., by preclusive statute with-
drawing jurisdiction] injunctive relief is available where administrative remedies are ...
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forming a third category. A number of cases, recently augmented, re-
ject the second exception as a limitation on review of arbitrariness.
148
Thus in 1966 there were four groups of decisions; and by his own test,
"there could not have been a codification of judicial decisions, for the
decisions were often conflicting."'149 The majority of courts since 1966
inadequate. This rule keeps the Comptroller from being a free-wheeling agency dispensing
federal favors; and it gives some assurance that he will render principled decisions . , .
370 F.2d at 887, all of which deprives the passing reference to First Nat'l of force. Compare
a later three-judge court case in the Eighth Circuit, Chamber of Commerce of Fargo, ND.,
v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 301, 805 (D.N.D. 1967): under Section 10(e ) the "Court has
the duty to hold unlawful and set aside agency action . .. found to be arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion .... "
In sum, Professor Davis can count on only one flat holding, Ferry v. Udall, which
apparently has been abandoned by the Ninth Circuit, and two passing references to
possible immunization in cases which said there could be review of arbitrariness in the
circumstances at bar. Nevertheless, these few cases underline the need for dispelling the
fog which Professor Davis has blown up around a very simple statutory phrase.
148. The second exception has been held inapplicable in Overseas Media Corp. v.
McNamara, 885 F.2d 808, 316 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1967):
Appellee apparently would have us adopt the view that the act of committing a matter
to an agency's discretion forecloses court consideration of an alleged abuse of discre-
tion. The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act belies this position
[quoting The McCarran-Donnell colloquy, p. 972 supra].
To the same effect, see Velasco v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 886 F.2d 283, 285
(7th Cir. 1967), which relied for jurisdiction on Section 10(e) and stated: "The standard of
review is whether the administrative agency committed an abuse of discretion," Though
the determination "was a matter of administrative discretion," it could be set aside for
a "clear abuse of such discretion." Id. at 286. And in Amarillo-Borger Express v. United
States, 188 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1956), a three-judge court rejected the argument that
arbitrariness was unreviewable because the matter was "committed to the discretion of
the Commission," id. at 415, concluding that the "exercise of discretion" is "precisely [one
ofj the matters which Congress .. . intended should be under, not exempt from, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act," id. at 418, citing the McCarran-Donnell colloquy. That is
also the implication of Judge Holtzoff's statement in American President Lines v. Federal
Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 846, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1953), quoted at p. 994 infra. See also
Homovich v. Chapman, quoted in note 30 supra. Finally, although Judge Friendly did ask
in Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1966), "whether the [Social Security]
Act 'so far' commits decision to reopen to agency discretion that a refusal would not be
open to review even in case of abuse," he declared that
we do not believe that Congress would have wished to close the doors of the courts
to a plaintiff whose claim for social security benefits was denied . . . because of a
truly arbitrary administrative decision .... Absent any evidence to the contrary, Con-
gress may be presumed to have intended that courts should fulfill their traditional
role of defining and maintaining the proper bounds of administrative discretion and
safeguarding the rights of the individual.
Rare are the statutes which give such "evidence to the contrary." Both Senate and House
reports state:
[It has never been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its statutes
from being confined to the scope of authority granted [i.e., "sound discretion'] ....
[Otherwise] statutes would in effect be blank checks drawn to the credit of some
administrative officer or board.
S. Doc. No. 248, at 212, 275.
149. Consider against the background of the cases cited in notes 145, 148 and 150, Pro.
fessor Davis's statement that "t]he uniform case law is in accord with [his interpretation
of] the literal words of the Administrative Procedure Act .... The courts uniformly give
effect to the literal words of the 'except' clause." Davis, Supplement 17. For comment on
his muddy use of "literal," see Appendix note 14 infra.
In his last word, he stated: "The Berger interpretation of the APA has nothing against
it except the clear statutory words, the unanimous Supreme Court, the unanimous lower
courts, and now the unanimous Congress in the codificationl" Davis, Not Always 644.
Glory Hallelujah.
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have sailed along without reference to the Davis "solution" or the
"codification" of his view;1I 0 and that view, though not tagged with
his name, has in fact been explicitly rejected by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, 51 which handles a large proportion of the administrative
agency litigation.
VI. Nonreview Exceptions
Before discussing pre-APA "exceptions" to the general rule that
arbitrariness is reviewable, let me repudiate a fatuous position that
Professor Davis would attribute to me. "Berger's main thesis," he as-
serts, "is that the Administrative Procedure Act makes administrative
arbitrariness or abuse of discretion always judicially reviewable."'52
By way of triumphant refutation he cites the Veterans Administration
Act, which "makes certain decisions on veterans' claims 'final and con-
clusive'" and provides that "no . . . court . . . shall have power or
jurisdiction to review."' 53 That situation is governed by the first ex-
ception of Section 10 for cases in which "statutes preclude review";
and when all jurisdiction to review is withdrawn by statute, the Sec-
tion 10(e) directive to set arbitrariness aside obviously cannot apply.'"t
Not for me the argument that one part of the Act makes hash of an-
other. Whether Congress may constitutionally cut off all review of a
constitutional claim is a different question, to which I have addressed
myself at considerable length elsewhere.lt 5 And if the Constitution
150. Overseas Media Corp. v. AfcNamara, 385 F.2d 308, 316 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1968), see
note 148 supra; Halsey v. Nitze, 390 F.2d 142, 144 (4th Cir. 1968), see note 147 supra. Louis-
ville 8& Nashville R.R. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Ky. 1967) ("An order is
arbitrary within the meaning of the APA if it lacks a stated rational basis'); Velasco v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 386 F.2d 283, 285, 286 (7th Cir. 1967), see note 148
supra; Chamber of Commerce of Fargo, N.D., v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 301, 305 (D.N.D.
1967), see note 147 supra; Atewooftakewa v. Udall, 277 F. Supp. 464, 468 n.7 (D. Okla. 1967)
("administrative action must have a 'reasonable' or 'rational' basis if it is to avoid the
stigma of arbitrariness'); Kolstad v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D. Mont. 1967)
(court -will not "substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agent)" if there
is a "rational basis" for the contusion).
151. Overseas Media Corp. v. McNamara, quoted in note 148 supra.
152. Davis, Not Always 643.
153. Id. 646; 72 Stat. 1115 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1966).
154. Professor Davis recognizes in a footnote that I confine my "discu "ion to the second
exception of § 10 [and consider] that anything governed by the first exception can be ex-
cluded from [my] discussion." Id. 652 n.30. But he comments: "One of the strangest posi-
tions Mr. Berger takes is that a court's denial of review on the ground that a statute
precludes review is not authority against his position that arbitrariness is always review-
able," id., appealing again to the "Not Always Reviewable" straw man to whom his last
piece was dedicated. For discussion of the relation between the two exceptions, see note
66 supra.
155. Since adequate discussion is impossible here, I must be content to say that my
own protracted re-examination of the source materials--the records of the Federal Con.
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itself cuts off review, a matter to which I shall recur, I would not be
so callow as to maintain that the APA overrides the Constitution.
The issue of pre-APA "exceptions" to the general rule that arbitrari-
ness is reviewable needs to be brought back into focus. The problem
is not, as Professor Davis assumes, "whether some agency action must
be unreviewable even to correct arbitrariness or abuse,"'
' 0 but, since
the statute governs, whether Section 10 makes it unreviewable,
whether it leaves room for exceptions to the Section 10(e) mandate
to set arbitrary action aside. If my analysis is sound, the terms of Sec-
tion 10, confirmed by the legislative history, unqualifiedly direct
courts to set arbitrariness aside. This may in Professor Davis's view be
regrettable, but only Congress can cure regrettable legislative over-
sights.
In considering the scope of Section 10(e) it needs constantly to be
borne in mind that Chairman Walter advised the House that agencies
"do not have authority in any case to act blindly or arbitrarily,
' ' 1
and that Chairman McCarran, shortly after enactment of the APA,
explained to the bar that it is a "major premise of the statute that
judicial review is not merely available but is plenary .... [N]o citizen
need complain that he is without it if he has been subjected to injury be-
yond the law."''1 8 Arbitrary action, be it remembered, is branded by
Section 10(e) as "not in accordance with law." In sum, as Judge
Holtzoff, a veteran of the Washington scene, stated:
Contemporary discussion and debate clearly demonstrate that one
of the main objectives of the Administrative Procedure Act was to
extend the right of judicial review. One of its purposes was to en-
large the authority of the courts to check illegal and arbitrary
administrative action.'
59
vention and of the state ratification conventions--and of other materials of that period,
as well as a large body of writing about those materials and sources, which is set forth I
R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SuPREM COURT, (to be published; Harvard University Press
1969), led me to concur in Professor Hart's view that it is (and was) "a necessary postulate
of constitutional government ... that a court must always be available to pass on decisions
of constitutional right to judicial process, and to provide such process if the claim is stus.
tamined .... " Hart, The Power of Congress to Lunit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1372 (1953). In Battaglia v. General Motors
Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (1948), the court said that Congress "must not so exercise" its
"undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction [of tile federal courts
... as to deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law ...
156. Davis, Supplement 17.
157. S. Doc. No. 248, at 368-69.
158. McCarran, Improving "Administrative Justice": Hearings and Evidence: Scope of
Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A.J. 827, 893 (1946).
159. American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3,16, 349 (D.C. Cir.
1953). See also Chairman McCarran's remark, p. 1000 infra. The Supreme Court has
admonished that courts should be hospitable towards the "greatly expanded ... availability
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With this in mind, let us turn to two of Professor Davis's most dra-
matic examples, the "exceptions" for the military and the executive
branch.
A. The Lllilitaqy "Exception"
Any assumption that the military is automatically shielded by a
"general presumption against review" of arbitrariness is foreclosed
by Sterling v. Constantin: "What are the allowable limits of military
discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a parti-
cular case, are judicial questions."' 60 Moreover, only specified functions
of the military are by the Section 2(a) definition of "agency" excluded
from the operation of this Act," namely "(2) courts martial and mili-
tary commissions," and (3) "military or naval authority exercised in
the field in time of war or in occupied territory." 16 These express
exclusions, under familiar principles, leave all other military functions
subject to the Act. As the Senate Report states: "certain war and de-
fense functions are exempted, but not the War or Navy departments
in the performance of their other duties."'1 2 Although Professor Davis
is aware that the military is included in Section 2(a),16 he never comes
to grips with the fact that Section 2(a) dearly makes the APA appli-
cable to its non- "in the field" functions. In effect he argues that Con-
gress could not have meant what it said, and offers what he apparently
considers a simply smashing example of absurdity: "A lieutenant in
Vietnam surely lacks authority to pick on the same private for every
dangerous mission, but that does not mean a court will or should
review.' 64 Since Professor Davis assumes that "the technical law is
that we are not at war in Vietnam,"'15 his example is not protected
by the Section 2(a) exclusion of acts "in the field in time of war." On
that hypothesis, a sorrier example to justify curtailment of the express
statutory directive is hardly conceivable. Let us go beyond Professor
Davis and assume a state of war, so that the courts by hypothesis
have no APA jurisdiction. Suppose too that the lieutenant, warped
by racial prejudice, persistently picks on a Negro for "every danger-
ous mission," which on the law of averages spells certain death. Should
of judicial review." Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,
349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955).
160. 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932).
161. 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946), now 5 U.S.C. § 551 (Supp III, 1968).
162. S. Doc. No. 248, at 191.
163. DAvIS, TREATISE § 28.16, at 81-82; Davis, Not Always 645.
164. Davis, Not Always 646.
165. Davis, Postscript 832.
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one even in this case dogmatically assume that review of unconstitu-
tional discrimination can be barred? 16
Another reductio ad absurdum posed by Professor Davis is an in.
quiry by the courts "whether a commanding officer of a domestic mili-
tary post has abused his discretion in denying a requested leave."'u "
Suppose that leave is persistently denied because the officer hates
Negroes or redheads; should we strain to construe the APA so as to
leave them at his mercy?0 8 Professor Davis misconceives the issue
when he asks: "Do we want the courts to review for possible abuse of
discretion all the determinations made by officers of the army, navy
and air forces in domestic military posts?"'10 9 What "we want" must
yield to what the statute provides; and as we have seen, the APA ex-
clusion of "in the field" functions manifests an intention to govern
the nonexcluded "domestic military post."'loa Nor is this as self-
evidently absurd as Professor Davis conceives. The Swedish Military
Ombudsman was created "to guard citizens against abuses in military
administration"; and if the examples cited by Professor Gellhorn 70
166. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957), involved the conviction by a court martial In
Britain of the wife of an Air Force sergeant for his murder. An Executive Agreement gave
our military courts exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Britain by American
servicemen or their dependents. In reply to objections that the court martial denied funda-
mental rights, the government invoked the treaty power. The Court held that "[t]he pro.
hibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National Gov-
ernment and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and Senate
combined." Parenthetically, the exception afforded "courts martial" by Section 2(a) was
unmentioned.
167. 4 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.18, at 82.
168. "Assuredly, the commanding officer of an aircraft carrier docked in New York
Harbor has absolute authority to order all visitors off at 5 P.M.; but may he order Jews
off at 3, or may he order that anyone can be put off by being dumped into the sea?" A.
BICKEL, THE L-ST DANGEROUS BRANCH 167 (1962).
169. Davis, Postscript 832 (italics in original). Of a soldier one may say, with even greater
justice, what Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961), said of a prisoner: "l]t has
never been held that upon entering a prison one is entirely bereft of all his civil rights and
forfeits every protection of the law." To the contrary, the Court long ago declared that "the
humblest seaman or marine is to be sheltered under the aegis of the law from any real
wrong." Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 123 (1849).
169a. The parallel was sharply drawn by the Supreme Court in O'Callalian v. l'arker,
37 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 2, 1969), where a rape committed offpost by an Army sergeant
was held not subject to court martial because it fell outside the fifth amendment exception
for cases "when in actual service in time of War or public danger." In consequence, the
statutory authorization of court martial ran afoul of fifth amendment guarantees,
170. Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1965). Among
prosecutions cited are those of "a commissioned officer who had insulted a nonconmmis-
sioned officer, and a commander who had punished draftees for being drunk" when "off-
duty or on non-military premises."
Profesor Jaffe notes:
There is quite obviously a movement in the direction of greater reviewability of mili-
tary determinations, particularly in peace time. This probably reflects the fact of the
peace time draft. The impact of military decision on the ordinary citizen is no longer
a rare event born of emergency. It intrudes into the civilian's peace time life and may
-witness the dishonorable discharge of the preinduction Communist-importantly
affect the conditions of civilian life.
L. JAFFE, JuDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE Acrox 368 (1966).
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might not run the gauntlet of Professor Davis's a priori assumptions,
they nevertheless give color of practicality to judicial review, even
of petty military tyranny.
It is of course possible that in considering military cases the courts
have overlooked the limited exemption for military affairs afforded
by Section 2(a) and the directive of Section 10(e) to set arbitrariness
aside. If that be the case, it is time to take account of these provisions;
and if this imposes an undue burden on the military, let Congress,
not Professor Davis, rewrite the Act.
B. The Executive "Exception"
In aid of a parade of horribles designed to demonstrate the wisdom
of his argument for "selective unreviewability," Professor Davis points
out that "the term 'agency' in the APA includes the President, cabinet
members and other executive officers,"'' 71 as indeed it does. My posi-
tion, he implies, forces me to advocate review of "the President's
activities in seeking peace in Vietnam," and of "the President's re-
cognition or refusal of recognition of a foreign government,"172 as
well as judicial authority "to decide whether President Kennedy
abused his discretion in the Bay of Pigs venture."'73 Whether a pri-
vate should be permitted, for example, to question President Ken-
nedy's decision to protect our country against the Soviet missiles
installed in Cuba may be doubtful. Possibly such determinations are
confided by the Constitution exclusively to the President and are
therefore placed beyond the reach of judicial review and Section 10 by
the "political question" doctrine. But such issues are far too important
to be brashly decided ex cathedra, particularly at a time when the
rights of the enlisted man are in the process of reexamination. Then
too, what person could reasonably maintain that a decision to enter
into peace negotiations, or to recognize China, "adversely affected"
him within the meaning of Section 10(a)? As always, it is more profit-
able to begin with the terms of the statute.
The inclusion of the President within the statutory term "agency"
was not an oversight; the express Section 2(a) exclusion of "Congress
[and] the courts" shows that the inclusion was deliberate. Congress
has never stood in awe of the President, as its steadfast insistence
over the years on securing information from the executive branch
171. Davis, Postscript 832.
172. Davis, Not Always 645.
173. Davis, Postscript 832.
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notwithstanding claims of "executive privilege" attests.174 Certainly
Chief Justice Marshall, who had participated actively in the Virginia
Ratification Convention, 175 was not overawed by the Presidency. In
the Aaron Burr trial he stated: "That the President of the United
States may be subpoenaed, and examined as a witness . . . is not
controverted.' 7 6 As for "cabinet members," Marshall stated in Mar-
bury v. Madison: "If one of the heads of departments commits any
illegal act, under color of his office, by which an individual sustains
injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone exempts him from
being sued . . -."177 In recent times, Secretary of Commerce Sawyer
was restrained from executing the President's decision to seize strike-
threatened steel mills in order to assure continued production during
the Korean war.'78 Professor Jaffe is thus quite correct in saying that
"Presidential action is not necessarily immune from judicial scrutiny.
...There should therefore be no rule which automatically bars a
judicial test of validity simply because the machinery of the Presidency
is implicated."' 79
Professor Davis places great stress on the Waterman case. 80 That
case, he states, "involved foreign relations some aspects of which called
for secrecy," and review of the President's order respecting foreign
air carriers was refused "even when a statute unequivocally required
review." The Court stated that the decision was "political, not judi-
174. Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. Rv. 1014, 1287
(1965).
175. See, e.g., 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON Tile AoiorioN
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553-54 (1881), where he stated, "To what quarter will you
look for protection from an infringement on the constitution, if you will not give the
power to the judiciary? There is no other body that can afford such protection,"
176. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,694, at 187, 191 (C.C. Va. 1807). In United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 200 (1882), the Court declared: "No man in this country is so
high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with
impunity. All officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of
the law, and are bound to obey it."
177. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). In the North Carolina Ratification Convention
James Iredell, a leader in the fight for adoption of the Constitution and later a justice
of the Supreme Court said, describing English law: "[N]o act of government should be
exercised but by the instrumentality of some person who can be accountable for It." 4 J.
ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION or THE FEDERAL CON-
STrrUTION 109 (1881) (emphasis added).
178. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 352 (4th ed.
1960); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
179. L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARv. L. REv. 401, 769, 778, 781 (1958).
Professor Frank Newman asks, with reference to the President's relation to a member of
his cabinet:
Should a cabinet officer be defenseless against findings of bribery or sexual immorality?
If he could show there was no evidence against him, or no evidence other than charges
of a confessed liar, relief by way of declaratory judgment might well be appropriate.
Newman, The Process of Prescribing "Due Process," 49 CALIF. L. REv. 215, 220 n.15 (1901).
180. Davis, Not Always 645, 651 n.21; Chicago &g So. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
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cial," i.e., "in the domain of political power and not subject to judicial
intrusion or inquiry,"'81 because, the court added, such decisions "are
wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments."'12
If that is indeed the fact, they lie outside Section 10(e) because Con-
gress cannot make reviewable that which is made unreviewable by
the Constitution. In any case, as Mr. Saferstein notes, a circuit court
of appeals stated in 1968 that "[t]hough Waterman has not been over-
ruled by the Supreme Court, its apparently sweeping contours have
been eroded by recent Circuit Court opinions."'18 And the Court it-
self has since declared in Baker v. Carr that it is "error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance."'1 4 After Waterman, Reid v. Covert held that
the treaty power cannot be employed by the Executive in derogation
of constitutional rights. 8 5 Professor Davis would thwvart the congres-
sional intention to make the executive branch accountable to an in-
dividual injured by its arbitrariness. If there are circumstances in
which the Executive enjoys constitutional immunity, let that be de-
cided on a record after hearing, not assumed at the threshold
for purposes of barring review.18i
VII. Conclusion
In sum, the general rule has been and remains that while courts
will not interfere with the sound exercise of discretion, they will re-
view administrative action to ascertain whether it has a "rational"
basis and is reasonable, or whether it is arbitrary. The cases cited ear-
lier demonstrate that this is an incontrovertible proposition. Neither
the military nor the Executive enjoys an absolute exemption from
review. Professor Davis and Mr. Saferstein have not shown, nor can
they show, that such exceptions to the general rule as existed prior
to the APA were called to the attention of Congress, much less that
Congress was asked to exempt them from the sweep of Section 10(e). 87
181. Davis, Not Always 645 (italics in original). Mr. Saferstein refers to the statute as
only "seeming to authorize ... review." Saferstein 878.
182. 333 U.S. at Ill.
183. Saferstein 378 n.45; Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483, 492
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
184. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
185. 354 U.S. 1 (1957), discussed at note 166 supra.
186. Compare Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir. 1959); in view of the Supreme
Court cases, said the court, "we cannot assume that the discretion granted the officials of
the Bureau ... is an unreviewable one."
187. Professor Davis claims only that "[t]he legislative history is not inconsistent with my
solution." Davis, Postscript 828.
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On the contrary, Chairman Walter stated that the Act was intended to
outlaw arbitrariness "in any case." And not foreseeing Professor
Davis's easy conversion of "committed" to "unreviewable," Chairman
McCarran stated: "It would be hard, therefore, for anyone to argue
that this Act did anything other than cut down the 'cult of discre-
tion'. ..."188 It follows that no appeal to pre-existing exceptions lies
for the purpose of cutting down the express statutory directive to set
arbitrariness aside.
The terms of the statute cannot be altered on the basis of personal
predilections and untested assumptions. If courts are to conclude that
a given application of Section 10(e) is unreasonable or absurd, let
it be on the basis of a carefully considered record, not a priori notions
of "intrinsic unsuitability" for review. That task calls for full con-
sciousness that the court is being asked to carve out an exception from
the express terms of the Act, not for unquestioning acceptance of Pro-
fessor Davis's "solution" to his semantic difficulties.
Chairman Walter opened his explanation of the APA with a refer-
ence to Pitt's warning that "unlimited power corrupts the possessor,"
and stated that "[t]oday, in the backwash of the greatest war in history,
we need not be reminded of the abuses which inevitably follow un-
limited power."' 89 The Section 10(e) directive to set arbitrary action
aside represents a studied attempt to bar the play of arbitrariness on
American soil, articulating a tradition that reaches back to James Wil-
son's declaration that "[e]very wanton ...and unnecessary act of au-
thority . . . is wrong and tyrannical."' 00 Professor Davis does not
disparage such sentiments; he professes to "share Mr. Berger's pas-
sionate belief in a Supreme Court remark that 'there is no place in
our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary power.' "101 But
he concludes that the courts "should not undertake to cure all arbi-
188. McCarran, Improving "Administrative Justice": Hearings and Evidence: Scope of
Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A.J. 827, 893 (1946). For the House of Lords' resounding rejection
of the "myth of unfettered discretion," see note 38 supra.
189. S. Doc. No. 248, at 351. Walter also noted that the Declaration of Independence
complained the King had sponsored "arbitrary government."
190. 2 J. WILSON, WoRKs 393 (Andrews ed. 1896). In 1789 R. H. Lee stressed "security
against the depredations and gigantic strides of arbitrary power." 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
525 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1834) (running title: "History of Congress"). "[P]rotection of the In.
dividual from the arbitrary or capricious exercise of power was then believed to be an
essential of free government." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 295 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Compare the proud boast of the General Court of Massachusetts in 1646: "Let
them shew where hath been more care and strife to prevent all arbitrariness." Quoted
in A. HowARD, TnE ROAD To RUNNYMEDE 400, 408 (1967).
191. Davis, Final Word 815. He also stated: "Every one would like to have arbitrariness
and abuse corrected." Davis, Supplement 17.
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trariness in government."' 92 Let them begin instead with curing such
arbitrariness as Section 10(e) directs. Courts too are under a duty to
respect the law. And in so doing they do well to bear in mind what
Congress dearly understood-the most callous official will think twice
before acting arbitrarily if he knows that the possibility of judicial re-
view hangs over his head.193 Reasonable judgments, even if mistaken,
must be accepted by the individual as part of the price of an ordered
society. But when unreasonable, they are intolerable. If they are to
be sustained-indeed if constitutionally they can be-it should be
after the most searching deliberation, not by resort to unfounded "pre-
sumptions against review."
Appendix
A. Legislative History Cited by Professor Davis
1. The Senate Committee said: "Section 10 on judicial review
does not apply in any situation so far as . . . agency action is by
law committed to agency discretion. . . . The basic exception of
matters committed to agency discretion would apply even if not
stated at the outset."'
The "basic exception" refers to the pre-APA discretion, defined by
the courts as "sound" discretion as distinguished from arbitrary
action or "abuse of discretion." Since Professor Davis's subsequent
redefinition of "committed" to mean "unreviewable" was not before
192. Davis, Final Word 815. He believes that "the principal hope in a fight against the
arbitrary exercise of discretion lies in measures other than judicial rcview." Davis, Post-
script 833. Perhaps the new measures he suggests might prove useful, if adopted; but in
the meantime I would not discard the tried and true.
"It is dear," states Professor Jaffe, "that the country looks, and looks with good reason.
not to the agencies, but to the courts for its ultimate protection against executive abuse."
Jaffe, The Right of Judicial Review, 71 HARv. L. Rv. 401, 406 (1958).
193. Both Senate and House Reports state that judicial review is "indispensable since
its mere existence generally precludes the arbitrary exercise of power." S. Doe. No. 248.
at 217, 281. Warner Gardner, a long time government servant, stated that "the availability
of judicial review is by far the most significant safeguard against administrative exces cs
which can be contrived." Gardner, The Administrative Process, in UGAL Imxsrrurro.s
TODAY AND To.moRnow 108, 138 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
One need not stop at the corruption of power:
[A] court should have the power to correct excessive administrative zeal. An agency is
prone to single-mindedness. Fairness requires that it be checked not only for errors of
law but for any patent injustice. The judges stand apart from the particular purposes
of the agencies. They are set up to embody the community's sense of justice. It is
appropriate that the concept of "abuse of discretion" be conceived and used with a
breadth sufficient to enable the courts to condemn shocking disproportion.
Jaffe, The Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, '76 HAnv. L. REv. 865, 870 (1963).
1. Davis, Postscript 827.
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Congress at the time of enactment, it cannot be maintained that the
Committee's quotation of the statutory words "by law committed"
gave its blessing to Professor Davis's redefinition. To the contrary,
Congress indicated that "committed" simply meant "granted to,"2 a
synonym for the dictionary definition, "entrusted with."
2. The House Committee said: "Section 10 on judicial review
does not apply in any situation so far as . . . agency action is by
law committed to agency discretion. . . . Where laws are so
broadly drawn that agencies have large discretion, the situation
cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure act . d..."3
Again "by law committed" means "by law committed" and nothing
more despite Professor Davis's implication that his redefinition of the
phrase was adopted. The reference to "broadly drawn" grants of "large
discretion" speaks to the problems raised by standards which confer
virtually limitless discretion. Where limits are not discernible, courts
cannot police them.
4
3. The Senate Judiciary Committee Print said of section 10: "The
introductory exceptions state the two present general or basic
situations in which judicial review is precluded-where (1) the
matter is discretionary or (2) statutes withhold judicial powers."
The word "present" seems to me [Davis] to indicate an intent to
have previously-existing law continue with respect to review of
discretion, and this is the interpretation courts have given.5
But immediately thereafter the Judiciary Committee Print stated that an
"abuse of discretion granted by law" was to be reviewable," thereby
precluding Professor Davis's subsequent redefinition of "committed"
and confirming that the "present" law with respect to "discretionary"
matters was that courts would not substitute their judgment for a "rea-
sonable" determination but would set aside an "abuse of discretion.
' 7
The few Davis citations of courts that uncritically echoed his "solu-
tion" barely stir the scales.8 Since Professor Davis seeks to carve out
an exception from the unqualified Section 10(e) directive, he must
show that Congress was aware of exceptional cases of nonreview and
intended to have such "previously-existing law continue." No such
2. See p. 976 supra.
3. Davis, Postscript 827.
4. The Senate Report states: "If, for example, statutes are drawn in such broad terms
that in a given case there is no law to apply, courts of course have no statutory question to
review. That situation cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure act but must
be treated by revision of statutes conferring administrative power." S. Doc. No. 248, at 212.
See also H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINI-
TION OF STANDARDS (1962).
5. Davis, Postscript 827.
6. S. Doe. No. 248, at 36, discussed at p. 976 supra.
7. See pp. 968-69 supra.
8. Compare notes 11, 145, 148 supra, with note 147 supra.
1002
Vol. 78: 965, 1969
Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis
evidence can be found, and the word "present" cannot carry the
burden.
4. The Attorney General said that section 10 "in general, de-
clares the existing law concerning judicial review." Mr. McFar-
land [ABA spokesman] said: "We do not believe the principle of
review or the extent of review can or should be greatly altered.
We think that the basic exception of administrative discretion
should be preserved, must be preserved."9
Given the general rule, expressed in numerous cases, that arbitrariness
is reviewable, the "general presumption for reviewability," the total
absence of mention of any case of nonreview that should be "pre-
served," plus Chairman Walter's statement that arbitrariness was
impermissible "in any case," it is idle to read into the Attorney
General's equivocal reference to "existing law" a congressional inten-
tion to limit its own express Section 10(e) directive. Mr. McFarland's
"basic exception of administrative discretion" must be read in light
of settled judicial usage, whereunder "discretion" meant "sound" dis-
cretion to the exclusion of its "abuse." If only Professor Davis could
muster even one legislative statement or clear intimation that non-
review of some instances of arbitrariness "must be preserved."
Indisputably "discretion" was to be "preserved." But the question
is "was any part of 'abuse of discretion' to be preserved?" and that
question is not answered by an assumption, in the teeth of judicial
statements to the contrary, that "discretion" comprehends "abuse of
discretion" and therefore arbitrary action was to be "preserved."
B. Issues of Scholarly Integrity
1. Repeatedly Professor Davis charges that although he pressed
me to make "corrections" of alleged "clear-cut misquotations" before
the publication of my Sequel, I refused because, he asserts, such cor-
rection "would destroy the basis for much of [Berger's] argu-
ment."' 0 A charge of willful misrepresentation in order to score in
scholarly debate, if true, would render me unworthy of credence. If
untrue, the charge tarnishes the scholarly integrity of a widely-cited
commentator.
The "neatest example" of my "misquotations," amongst several that
involve the same facts and which he states makes him "look hilariously
inconsistent,"-" does in truth reveal a glaring inconsistency which his
tortuous explanation cannot remove. My articles demonstrated that his
argument for a "literal" interpretation of the second "except" clause
is at war with his statement that
9. Davis, Postscript 827.
10. Davis, Not Always 646, 653 n.34. See also p. 1005 infra.
11. Id. 653 n.M.
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[t]he literal language says that a court shall set aside an abuse of
discretion except so far as the agency may exercise discretion. But
this makes neither grammatical nor practical sense, for the ex-
ception consumes the whole power of the reviewing court.12
To my query how he can in good conscience espouse mutually con-
tradictory positions he replied, "The answer to this crucial question is
easy."' 3 Boiled down by himself, this "easy answer" is:
I have consistently said that the combination ["of the 'except'
clause with the 'abuse of discretion' phrase"] cannot be read
literally, and I have consistently said that the "except" clause
alone or in any combination other than with the "abuse of discre-
tion" phrase is and should be read literally.'
4
If, however, the "except" clause cannot be read "literally" in combina-
tion with the "abuse of discretion" phrase, then the "literal" reading
of the "except" clause was totally irrelevant to the subject of our de-
bate, the impact of the "except clause" on "abuse of discretion." Why
then did he repeatedly bombard me with a "literal" reading of the
"except" clause? For example: "Mr. Berger wants to interpret away the
'except' clause. The courts uniformly give full effect to the literal words
of the 'except' clause.''5 "Unlike Mr. Berger," the courts "uniformly"
read the "except" clause "literally";' 6 they uniformly decide in "accord
with the literal words."' 7 Even the Supreme Court "reads that clause
literally."'I s Only Berger "rejects a literal interpretation of the provi-
12. Davis, Supplement 21.
13. Davis, Not Always 650 n.11.
14. Id. 653 n.34 (emphasis added). In fuller statement;
First, I have never said that the combination of the "except" clause with 10(e) makes
no sense; what I have said is that the combination of the "except" clause with the"abuse of discretion" phrase of 10(e) makes no sense. Secondly, the literal reading of
the "except" clause is always used in any combination other than with the "abuse of
discretion" phrase. The literal reading is used in combinations with (a), (b), (c), (d),
and all parts of (e) except the "abuse of discretion" phrase.
I know of no reason for rejecting a literal interpretation of the following combina-
tion of the "except" clause with a part of 10(e): 'Except so far as . . .agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion. . . (e) . . . the reviewing court shall ...
(B) ... set aside agency action ... found to be (1) arbitrary ....
Id. 650 n.11. What Professor Davis means by "literally" is never made clear. If it means
that the exception for "discretion" must be read to exclude all review of discretionary ac-
tion, it "consumes the whole power of the reviewing court." Davis, Supplement 21. If by
"literally" he means to identify the word "committed" in "committed to agency discretion'
with "unreviewability," see note 48 supra, he gives an even more extraordinary meaning
to "literally." What is "literal" about an arbitrary professorial redefinition of a word that
ordinarily means "entrust with" to mean "unreviewable," and how are judges to know
this is the "literal" meaning? Yet Professor Davis insists that "courts are unanimously
giving the 'except' clause a literal interpretation"; courts uniformly read this provision
literally, because they believe that Congress intended what it so clearly said"-namely
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sion of § 10."19 To my demonstration that the Section 10(e) directive
to set aside "abuse of discretion" was unaffected by the "except lause,
he replied:
[Berger's] position [is] that the except clause of § 10 must be read
as if it is not there. For instance, he says flatly at page 63 that "the
'discretion' exception does not bar review of 'abuse of discre-
tion' . . . ." He realizes that Congress has provided for review
"except so far as... agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion," and that writing the "except" clause out of the Act
does violence to the plain words. But he explicitly says that "a
literal reading must be rejected."20
Undeniably, therefore, Professor Davis combined his "literal" reading
of the "discretion" exception with the "abuse of discretion" phrase
in order to rebut my position that the exception did not curtail the
Section 10(e) directive to set arbitrariness aside. His latest assertion
that the "combination [of the "except" clause with the "abuse of dis-
cretion" phrase] cannot be read literally" is patently irreconcilable
with his earlier statements.
Moreover, he now stands his earlier argument on its head. On
his present explanation a "literal" reading of the "except" clause is
applicable to all the Section 10(e) categories other than the "abuse
of discretion" phrase; it therefore "consumes [virtually] the whole
power of the reviewing court" and would render it powerless to re-
view discretionary action that was unconstitutional or in excess of juris-
diction. Can he really mean this? If even now I fail to understand him,
I may be excused for "refusing" to admit that I had "misquoted" him.
As well answer yes or no to the question "Have you stopped beating
your wife?" And if the "except" clause cannot be read "literally" in
"combination . . . with the 'abuse of discretion' phrase," he has
proved my point: the exception for "discretion" has no application to
"abuse of discretion."
Such are the shifts of desperate advocacy. It is on the basis of such
materials that Professor Davis dares to charge, "Berger refuses to make
correction. Making correction would destroy his argument."2'
My argument, however, does not stand or fall on a collateral com-
ment on Professor Davis' shifting positions. My argument is that the
exception for "discretion" and the "abuse of discretion" directive in-
corporate the judicial antithesis between reasonable, and therefore
unreviewable, action, and arbitrary, and therefore reviewable, con-
duct.
2. Another issue of scholarly accuracy, if not of veracity, is posed
by his statement that
19. Id. 25.
20. Id. 16 (emphasis added). See also Appendix note 14 supra.
21. Davis, Not Always 654 n.34.
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[t]he presumption idea was first advanced in my article . . . and
later carried into ... my Treatise. When the first of Mr. Berger's
four articles appeared, I asked him why he ignored my § 28.21.
By letter of March 2, 1965, he said that that section he had "in-
advertently missed, much to my [Berger's] regret." In his later
three articles he has never mentioned either his inadvertence or
his regret.22
Let my published explanation speak for itself:
He observes that these "fundamentals" would "[enlarge] . . . the
area of reviewability," and yet I "ignored" them. [Davis, Com-
ment 16]. This is yet another index of his indifference to accuracy.
In his letter to me of February 23, 1965, he asked, "Why did you
ignore my § 28.21?" My reply of March 2 stated that "you your-
self lay down principles in § 28.21 (which I did not 'ignore' but
inadvertently missed, much to my regret) which are at war with an
easy assumption that arbitrariness should be insulated. ' 23
Careless misstatement in a commentator to whom the courts are con-
strained to turn for guidance is lamentable.
22. Id. 652 n.32 (emphasis added).
23. Berger, Reply 806 n.130.
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